Course of action: some GWOT recommendations

This is the conclusion, for now, of "The War on Terror and the Fire Paradox" blog post series.

So how should America go about its 'war' against terrorism? The root cause of terrorism needs ample understanding, thus helping in the fight, or what could be described as a fight, more against the source of terrorism than its effects. An issue with counterterrorism efforts abroad is that cooperation — if not total coordination — with the local government at the site of the operation is needed, as well as with others who may be affected.

The 9/11 Commission, set up over a year after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks upon the United States, gave a handful of major recommendations for an American course of action in the global battle against radical Islamic terrorism. "But the enemy is not just "terrorism," some generic evil. This vagueness blurs the strategy. The catastrophic threat at this moment in history is more specific. It is the threat posed by Islamist terrorism — especially the al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology." (p.362)

The 9/11 Commission Report also states education as a major preventative effort in states susceptible to breeding or attracting terrorism, as is economic development aid (pp.377-379). In addition, the report stresses a positive image of the United States in the Muslim world in order to allow the US to be seen as a legitimate and positive force, and not hinder its operations with governments wishing to help in battling extremism (pp.376-377).

Not only does the transnational flow of terrorists and their radical movements need to be halted, but a helpful combination of good PR (but not propaganda), economic agreements (but not unreasonable concessions), and open-channel diplomacy (but not a free-for-all) should be kept with states suspected of harboring — or even directly or indirectly supporting — terrorism. Countries like Syria, which is a major hub for insurgents entering Iraq, could help in the fight against terrorism if they were not shunned by the US. In Syria's case*, good relations with America could even bring the state further from more devious states like Iran. Lest we forget, terrorism is a problem for other governments too, even 'evil' ones. Most every state in the Middle East and North Africa fears terrorism of the radical Islamic persuasion.

The US cannot fight its war alone either. It needs to be willing to reach out to friends and foes alike, observing the greater good while still keeping on the ethical side of things. Guantanamo Bay does little in helping the war on terrorism, except in political ways for the Bush administration — e.g. when a suspect 'confesses' to some sort of scary-sounding terrorist plot, it raises political support for the White House. Gitmo is a negative symbol in the war on terror and looks bad from close allies like the United Kingdom as well as disgruntled Middle Easterners who already mad enough at America — things like Gitmo may well push them over the edge and radicalize the population, thus playing into the extremists' hands. Not to mention the fact it's a legal and human rights disgrace, an example of how freedom suffers at the hands of those who fight in the name of security (freedom v. security). These extremists resort to big measures to get public opinion on their side; the US is only helping them by providing perfect rallying cries: 'the imperial occupiers, who kill your brothers and bombed your village wish to harm us further', etc.

As Joseph Nye points out in a Foreign Affairs article from May/June 2004, you cannot just use military power in the 'war on terror' — perception matters*, whether in the eyes of allies or enemies. Allies must see the United States' foreign policy as legitimate, other must see it as non-threatening. Anti-Americanism is more serious than some in Washington think, and it’s high time to take actions to limit the resent against America.

References

Ferguson, Niall. Colossus: the Rise and Fall of the American Empire. New York: Penguin, 2004.

Ikenberry, G. John. “America’s Imperial Ambition”. Foreign Affairs Sept/Oct 2002.

Nye, Joseph S., Jr. “The Decline of America's Soft Power: Why Washington Should Worry”. Foreign Affairs May/June 2004.
---. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: PublicAffairs, 2005.

United States. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report. By Thomas H. Kean, et al. New York: W.W. Norton, 2004.
* = a post from this blog

America’s imperial motives, real and perceived

There is a perception in the Mid-East and elsewhere that the United States is a hostile, hegemonic power. Even though that’s wishful thinking, the reality is quite different. Still, political leaders from Russia’s Vladimir Putin to al Qaeda’s Osama bin Laden are able to use the imperialistic, evil superpower approach to get support. In bin Laden’s case, that support is used to fight the US; in Putin’s case it is just used to make his people think they need a protector (him) and increase his power. Ironically leaders use fear of the US to increase their own political motives as American policy makers use fear of those other leaders to increase their power. The United States' post-9/11 foreign policy has not only made it arguably more vulnerable to attack — because of perception and the fueling of terrorist insurgent movements — but has also damaged diplomatic ties. This is emphasized by the Bush Doctrine.

The Mid-East has a history of being colonized by European powers, though not as completely as some other areas of the world. Much of what is now the Mid-East fell under the Ottoman Empire, which was reduced to Turkey soon after the start of the 21st century. Cries of neoimperialism are common in modern politics in formerly colonized countries. Leaders like Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe craft alternative universes in which America and others are ruthlessly trying to take his nation, and he is the only one who can stop them. These tactics include using false, victimized versions of history along with peppered terror rhetoric about how the world’s powers are set to invade. Similar cries can be heard among Islamist leaders, albeit with a more religious spin. America, the Great Satan, is out to get all of Islam, they say, and will not rest until it controls all of the fruitful, oil-rich Middle East. Depending on how one defines 'empire' and perceives 'empire', there may or may not be an American Empire.

If the US was so obsessed in controlling all oil resources in the Middle East — and indeed if it invaded Iraq for the oil — as it is alleged, policy would be different. Ferguson points out the flaws in the ‘America is only interested in the Mid-East for the oil' argument in Colossus (p. 109):

[America] would surely have ... difficulty in one fundamental respect. For nothing could have been better calculated to alienate the Arab peoples than constant support for the state of Israel.

Whether America is a true hegemonic demon or not, there is no doubt it has tried to exert its power as the global police, the untouchable enforcer of self-defined good, the setter of standards and prime user of force, under the Bush administration. The neoconservative role in the White House has not only expanded the presidency at home, but attempts to do the same abroad, with a neoimperial zest for self-supremacy. However, as the US tries to expand its world power, its foes use that to their advantage, striving to make their people believe the US has already made itself a full-fledged empire. The neoimperial actions are likely to fail, says G. John Ikenberry,

If history is any guide, it will trigger resistance that will leave America in a more hostile and divided world.

Threats of force like preemption, a prime area of the Bush Doctrine, which was used in the case of the Iraq war, are not likely to be received well by the international community either.

Soft is good, or why ambivalence wins over coercion

America is attacking the symptoms rather than the problem — the source — of terrorism. To explain the faults of America’s counterterrorism policy, in regards to its foreign policy, one must observe what exactly that policy is. To operate in a more stable power balance, the US must employ soft power — which Joseph Nye calls "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion" — rather than the military coerciveness and saber rattling of hard power.

The origins of terrorism are also an issue to be studied. As far as counterterrorism’s woes go, the fire paradox is a problem and side-effect; soft power might just be part of the solution. Perception is a key element in this soft power, and a component in the fire paradox. The perception of America’s counterterrorism efforts abroad makes them all the more futile.

Soft power face-off: Ferguson v. Nye

Not everyone is a fan of ‘soft power’...



technorati tags: niall+ferguson, joseph+s+nye+jr, nye, ferguson, soft+power, soft-power, international+relations, foreign+policy, politics, IR-theory, empire, imperial+power, perception

Map of the GWOT, perception, and the fire paradox

Perception plays a key role in the so-called war on terror (or, in its global state, the GWOT) and the resulting blowback of US counterterrorism foreign policy: the fire paradox. Instead of focusing just on the domestic political and strategic front of the 'war on terror', I'll look at the US foreign policy and, specifically, the issue of perception in the fire paradox, a result of American counterterrorism efforts abroad, involved in the fight against terrorism.

Origins: radical Islamic terrorism and terrorist threat; US politics in general.
Map


Doing the math
War on terror [politics, policy] (retaliative strike against 9/11 terror attacks, etc.; counterterrorism) + global (allies + terror movements, etc.)
Perception [power] + ideology [both sides] (effect of war)
Fire paradox [some counterterrorism feeds terrorism] (blowback: side effect of war, perception plays key role) ideological + military

Reasoning
Fire paradox of US foreign counterterrorism of GWOT — Many counterterrorism policies ironically help inflame/incite terrorism because…

of US ideological stance (e.g., 'us against them') — (global) GWOT ideology

political decisions — GWOT policy

helps foster the idea of America as an imperial, evil power — GWOT perception

Blowback: then, now, and in the years to come

A term used to describe the detrimental side effects — unintended by the US — of the current American fight in the civil war in Iraq is 'blowback'. Blowback is similar to the fire paradox in that they share the same premise: in fighting something, be it a war or insurgent terrorists in general, the opposite of intended outcomes are realized. Blowback is more specific to the fire paradox, because the fire paradox can be applied to, as used as an example in this paper, how certain policies in the 'war on terrorism' just create more terrorism. However, blowback can also be used to describe a case where terrorists are bred.

An article in Foreign Affairs presented the blowback argument — revisited. "Today's insurgents are tomorrow's terrorists,” the authors, Peter Bergen and Alec Reynolds, said. They also shared the parallels between America helping Afghan terrorists in what could effectively be described as a proxy war against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and the current US involvement in Iraq. The jihadist success in Afghanistan, which succeeded in forcing the Soviets to withdrawal, resulted in a worldwide surge in similar terrorist movements in the name of Islam.

Just as Palestine has been a breeding ground for terrorists — linked with others (mostly Arab Muslims) united against Israel — because of their plight, Iraq too is becoming the next major front for terrorist recruitment, more against America than ever. Some of this terrorism is targeted at the foreign troops, some at the weak Iraqi government, and some is just to stir up the sectarian violence. US occupation just worsens the radicalization. And seeing democracy as the cure is as shortsighted as it is naive. How could a democracy operate when the capitol building is a constant target of suicide bombers? Blowback in Iraq and Palestine will likely continue for at least another generation, if not longer if the civil war ceases to subside in Iraq and Israel and Palestine do not come so a final accord.

So could Iraq's potential or current terrorists come back and haunt the US and, indeed, the world? In reality, they already are. More so than in the case of Afghanistan? Probably. The civil war and American occupation, as well as an influx of terrorists, has made Iraq a hotbed of Islamic extremism.

Multivoice poem: three fronts related to the GWOT

Intense: three battlegrounds, three stories, one event tying them all together
1. Sweat dripped down the interior of his damn clothes.
2. Sweat dropped from his brow as he stared at endless letters on the screen.
3. A bead of sweat swam down the darkened shoulder of the Marine.

1. Why must I wear these shameful rags, if only to fit in, he thought… it is a necessary disguise for the attack.
2. This is it, he thought, the reason he had become an analyst: to stop the terrorists who killed his mother.
3. Why the hell did he answer the call of patriotism from within him, why did he listen to that recruitment poster, he thought — who was this war protecting? He had enrolled after the terrorist attack; how could he be so naïve?

1. Was everything in place? He hoped so. The attack was soon.
2. He saw the sign, the attack is near; he raced to the office of his superior.
3. Another roadside bomb, another brother killed – more innocents too.

1. He fantasized more: Soon he would be in heaven, these infidels one and all burning in the flames of their own damnation.
2. The proof was in front of him, but no one would listen; arrogant national security bureaucrats cannot be reasoned with.
3. After the spike of adrenaline everyone must have felt, he slowed the vehicle down.

1. His brothers looked like they were soon to begin the operation.
2. He kicked the glass door, it did not break, but his toe hurt like hell, he didn’t know whether that was good or bad — there were more important things than a screwed toe about to happen.
3. Bullets rained upon the convoy, death followed in their trail.

1. A prayer was said; and then the attack began.
2. An hour later breaking news flashed across the television screen: terrorist attack.
3. War is a machine of death, killing those around you — killing those you know, and those you don’t. He was one of the lucky ones though. But why was he lucky? If only there were more.

A look back to a moment in history: 9/11

Did political change result from the terrorists, or from the American politicians? After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks (9/11), Americans defied the terrorists, at least in the way the government wanted, by showing their patriotism — or what the Bush administration defined as 'patriotism' — and continuing their American way of life.

The media followed along, so a virtual political monopoly was instigated. Both major political parties looking to the White House, declaring their unity and support for America, and the fight against the perpetrators of 9/11. After all, the terrorists attacked because they were angry at the US's freedom, right? As soon as the Bush White House noted how easily people could be controlled and manipulated for political capital, the guise of a war on terror was put up.

There’s no vast conspiracy, but the Bush administration did use 9/11 as an excuse for its many following endeavors in fronts in its global war on terrorism (GWOT). The effects of the fire paradox of insurgent terrorism have been around forever, but the policies of the war on terror, which feed into the paradox even more, have not. The so-called war on terror was the result of 9/11.

So what other effects did 9/11 produce? Juan Cole, an expert on Iraq and terrorism, wrote some intriguing ideas in an article entitled "Think Again: 9/11". Cole says 9/11 did not change everything, and "For all their visibility and drama, the 9/11 attacks left untouched many of the underlying forces and persistent tensions that shape international politics."

He says 9/11 was less of a clash of civilizations, and more of a 'clash over policy'. Cole insists, and cites numerous studies, Muslims are fine with the West, with democracy, with the western way of life. In fact, the only lifestyle area where the Muslim world is less fine with is things like homosexuality and liberal sexual lifestyles — the same things American conservatives and evangelicals scorn.

Autonomy and national independence appear to be part of what Muslims mean by “democracy,” and they consider Western interventions in Muslim affairs a betrayal of democratic ideals. September 11 and the American response to it have deepened the rift over policy, but they haven’t created a clash of civilizations.

When asked on whether 'the war on terror has no end', Cole replies "that's the plan":

The Bush administration has defined the struggle vaguely precisely so that it can’t end; George W. Bush clearly enjoys the prerogatives of being a war president. So, the administration has expanded the goals and targets of this war from one group or geographical area to another.
…
After 9/11, the Bush administration transformed the losers in those conflicts [Iraq and Afghanistan] into winners. But the civil wars continue, with the unseated groups now playing the role of insurgents.

Cole concludes: "Al Qaeda may not have fundamentally changed the world on 9/11, but that is no reason to give it a second chance."

Hopefully when or if the next 9/11 comes, the US government will be less haphazard in its foreign policy in response to terrorism, will learn about and — instead of just making it worse — try to get around the fire paradox using alternative methods to fighting terrorism. In addition, hopefully the American people, and, in fact, the people extremists claim to represent, won’t get fooled again.

Juan Cole, by the way, is an expert on Iraq and the Middle East, a professor of history at the University of Michigan, and a blogger. His Iraq- and Mid-East-focused blog is called Informed Comment.

technorati tags: juan+cole, terrorism, 9/11, september+11+terrorist+attackes, history, politics, international

The facets of terror

Throughout this month, I will be posting excerpts of my lengthy paper "The War on Terror and the Fire Paradox", as mentioned in this post. Here is one such excerpt...

Perspectives
The facets of terror
How can a rogue group or ideology commit acts of terrorism with major state reaction, but state terrorism yields no such reaction? Is fighting in something you genuinely believe in a crime? How is Islamic extremist recruitment for terrorism different from recruitment to a state military?

Whether fighting the foreign occupiers in Iraq, fighting the western menace from within its own borders, or abroad, there is a new kind of terrorism and no one seems to know what to define it as. Call it an insurgency against the West, call it a rebellious movement, call it pure terrorism.*

They fear the west; westerners fear them. The middlemen? The governments of the West, namely of the US, and the extremist Islamic groups. Terror, terror, terror; fear, fear, fear; counterterrorism, counterterrorism, counterterrorism; fear, fear, fear; terror, terror, terror... We usually think of the extremists as the terrorists; the western governments as the fighters of terrorism.

[What the 'terrorists' (supposedly) do] — [what the US 'war on terror' response is].
They want to invoke fear with their terror — I invoke your fear to fight their terror.
They use terrorism to take away our freedom — I use (counter)terrorism to actually take that freedom away.
They use acts of insurgency against us (e.g. in Iraq) — we shall stay (e.g. in Iraq).
They use terrorism to scare you — I use fear-mongering to my gain to scare you using their terror as an excuse.

Political science expert John Mueller says the terrorist threat has definitely been hyped up since 9/11, no doubt to the political gain of the Bush administration. Not only that, but the endeavors in Iraq and Afghanistan that followed inflamed feelings in the Muslim world even more. Mueller calls the lack of terrorist response on US soil, in which reality has contradicted what those in the White House keep stating, a "myth of the omnipresent enemy". He starts his article, "Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?: The Myth of the Omnipresent Enemy", with:

Despite all the ominous warnings of wily terrorists and imminent attacks, there has been neither a successful strike nor a close call in the United States since 9/11. The reasonable -- but rarely heard -- explanation is that there are no terrorists within the United States, and few have the means or the inclination to strike from abroad.

Mueller boldly concludes his article with:

Although it remains heretical to say so, the evidence so far suggests that fears of the omnipotent terrorist…may have been overblown, the threat presented within the United States by al Qaeda greatly exaggerated. The massive and expensive homeland security apparatus erected since 9/11 may be persecuting some, spying on many, inconveniencing most, and taxing all to defend the United States against an enemy that scarcely exists.

The Bush administration dumbs down all terrorism by labeling it as the evil, generic masses of Islamic extremists that are against the United States in every way. Al Qaeda is seen as a great terrorist enemy, a diabolical organization with cells all around the world. In reality, many experts disagree with the Bush administration view; al Qaeda is more of a movement, an ideology even, than an organization (see Burke in "Think Again: Al Qaeda").

* For the sake of keeping things simple, I will keep the assumed label of 'terrorist' for the extremists — in this case the radical Islamic insurgent terrorists. However, both sides, whether led by George W. Bush or Osama bin Laden, are using fear tactics to garner political support for their respective causes. The ultimate definition of terrorism I will lead up to the reader. However, that is not to say I will not present my clear views on the subject.

See here for a look at terrorism from two different viewpoints: that of the White House and that of the jihad movements.

Counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, counterintuitive

Throughout this month, I will be posting excerpts of my lengthy paper "The War on Terror and the Fire Paradox", as mentioned in this post. Here is one such excerpt...

Persuasive essay
To-the-point: counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, counterintuitive
Why do many current counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency, policies only make it all worse? US Global War on Terror and the proliferation of the radical, fundamentalist Islamic ideology in a terrorist insurgency relate to and feed on each other. One of the main causes of insurgent terrorism — modern and historical — may well be the fight against terrorism: counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Battles launched in the name of terrorism or against the name of terrorism often have the same affects: causing both sides to recruit for their pro- or counterterrorist causes.

One of my main doctrines, if you will, of the Middle East and elsewhere is that vengeance leads to vengeance. An eye for an eye is a ludicrous notion; why would one what everyone to be blind, including one’s self? This all relates to something called the fire paradox. This paradox is often used to describe how the fight against naturally reoccurring wildfires just leads to more of them — in greater number and voracity. I also apply it to counterterrorism, especially in the Middle East. Not to say we should not try to slow the rise of terrorism at all, but the way countries like the United States and Israel go about their anti-terrorism efforts is self-defeating and creates more destruction on both sides.

The fire paradox can be applied to the Middle East situation. The Gaza and West Bank problems will not go away until Israel and the US stop trying to destroy what they see as the problem, thus elevating the real problem. It is like with wildfires. Scientific data shows that the more people try to stop and put out wildfires, the greater in extremity and number those fires will be. The term — which I just found out existed after I wrote it down as the title a blog post — "fire paradox" was coined by European scientists launching a project to work on the ecological problem related to fires. This paradox applies to aspects of the situation in the Middle East, especially to what is going on in Iraq and Israel-Palestine. What Israel's decades-old policy does is destroy "terrorists", but the way they go about doing so creates a greater number of these "freedom fighters" who fight harder than ever. In fact, Israel’s policy directly affects perception in the Muslim world of America and, thus, relates to the so-called war on terrorism. The policy also spawns more terrorist movements and support for Islamic extremism.

The Israel-Palestine issue is a central fissure between the Muslim world and the West (i.e. N America and Europe) and connects policy to perception — especially since the US strongly supports Israel in an open manner — to terrorism, then resulting in counterterrorism/war on terror policy and more terror. One thing people can agree on is that "perceived threats to Islam create support for terrorism" (Fair, Haqqani "Think Again: Islamist Terrorism"). Because of the preemptive doctrine of the GWOT, nations and their peoples are even more apprehensive over American military action.

In discussing terrorism and the war on terror, one must also mull over insurgency, especially in areas tied politically to the war on terror, i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan. Those two countries are now hotbeds for terrorist recruitment. Between the sectarian militias fighting each other and the US in civil war-stricken Iraq and the resurgence of the fundamentalist Taliban in Afghanistan who knows how long the battle with insurgent terrorists will last — whether local to where the insurgency is, or even carried by a movement abroad. A notable article on counterinsurgency, which is directly related to counterterrorism and the fire paradox, is "Dead End: Counterinsurgency warfare as military malpractice" by Edward Luttwak.

True, there are the alternative methods and tactics of counterinsurgency warfare, but do they actually work? Insurgents do not always win, but their defeats can rarely be attributed to counterinsurgency warfare, as we shall see.
...
[There's an] essentially political nature of the struggle against insurgents. ... amid the frustrations of fighting a mostly invisible enemy
...
a necessary if not sufficient condition of victory is to provide what the insurgents cannot: basic public services, physical reconstruction, the hope of economic development and social amelioration. The hidden assumption here is that there is only one kind of politics in this world, a politics in which popular support is important or even decisive, and that such support can be won by providing better government. ...many people prefer indigenous and religious oppression to the freedoms offered by foreign invaders [in Iraq or Afghanistan].
…
Instead, they obeyed…who summoned them to fight against the ungodly innovations of the foreign invader. ...That was all that mattered to most…not what was proposed but by whom it was proposed.
…
The vast majority of Afghans and Iraqis naturally believe their religious leaders. The alternative would be to believe what for them is entirely unbelievable: that foreigners are unselfishly expending blood and treasure in order to help them.

Altruism isn't something people can easily be convinced of, especially if the source is a long time 'enemy'. Contrary to popular belief, support for terrorism and jihad may not correlate with poverty as much as previously thought (see Fair, Haqqani), although education and willingness to believe things other than what religious or political authorities tell people does matter.

...
[Insurgents] must have at least the passive cooperation of local inhabitants. …out of sympathy for their cause or in terror of their vengeance...
…
The essentially political advantage of the insurgents in commanding at least the silence of the local population cannot be overcome by technical means no matter how advanced.
...
All its best methods, all its clever tactics, all the treasure and blood that the United States has been willing to expend, cannot overcome the crippling ambivalence of occupiers who refuse to govern, and their principled and inevitable refusal to out-terrorize the insurgents, the necessary and sufficient condition of a tranquil occupation.

The original 'fire paradox'

Throughout this month, I will be posting excerpts of my lengthy paper "The War on Terror and the Fire Paradox", as mentioned in this post. Here is one such excerpt...

The original 'fire paradox'
From the Fire Paradox project website:

The fire paradox is visible on every continent. … In Europe, a few years later than North America, it became apparent that a systematically implemented policy of fire exclusion in fact often produces the opposite of the desired effect. It aggravates the overall fire risks, due to an increase in the "protected", accumulating biomass. Based on the experience of a few practitioners and the results of past fire ecology research, the aim of this project is to develop new policies for fire management and forest fire risk reduction, adapted to European constraints.

Many counterterrorism/counterinsurgency efforts just lead to the spread of terrorism and the movement’s growth, much like how the efforts against natural fires only worsens them in the future. Osama Bin Laden is not a tree; but you get my point. Also, the real fire paradox sometimes calls for intentional fire-starting; prescribed burning, if you will. In no way am I saying we should promote terrorism, but many counterterrorism efforts do just that.

While one might be able to lessen the chance and extremity of future wildfires by not using counterintuitive preventative measures, the fight against terrorism is different — and, albeit, more complex. If one does not try to fight (per se) terrorism at all, the terrorism could be about just as bad. That’s why measures other than the ones being used by the Bush administration are needed. Nonetheless, many counterterrorism or moderate counterinsurgency efforts end up feeding into the basic premise of the fire paradox: the counter- efforts only make the original enemy, the thing being countered, worse.

Want a rough background on the paradox? See my first post on it.

Nothing to fear but fear (terrorism) itself?

The source of terror is a matter deeply debated between scholars. Terrorists generally view themselves to be above any laws or authority — after all, that’s what they are fighting. Terrorism is political violence; violence is used to incite fear and change; intimidation with either the fear of violence or the direct connection between violence and the resulting fear.

The Bush administration's "war on terror" has proven to be a perfect utility for the reaping of political capital and the submission of the American people. I've argued that since day one of this blog. Since then, I've branched out and have been writing a paper on "The War on Terror and the Fire Paradox", while posting excerpts (the final, edited copy will be posted as a PDF and text file once it is finished).

Naturally, I am not the only person who believes the 'war on terror' is a tool of a diluted sort of terror in itself — but not in the pejorative sense we often think of when we hear the word "terrorism". A great opinion piece in the Washington Post was published today that echoes many of my arguments:

The "war on terror" has created a culture of fear in America. The Bush administration's elevation of these three words into a national mantra since the horrific events of 9/11 has had a pernicious impact on American democracy, on America's psyche and on U.S. standing in the world. Using this phrase has actually undermined our ability to effectively confront the real challenges we face from fanatics who may use terrorism against us.

The damage these three words have done -- a classic self-inflicted wound -- is infinitely greater than any wild dreams entertained by the fanatical perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks when they were plotting against us in distant Afghan caves. The phrase itself is meaningless. It defines neither a geographic context nor our presumed enemies. Terrorism is not an enemy but a technique of warfare -- political intimidation through the killing of unarmed non-combatants.
...
The sense of a pervasive but otherwise imprecise danger was thus channeled in a politically expedient direction by the mobilizing appeal of being "at war."

To justify the "war on terror," the administration has lately crafted a false historical narrative that could even become a self-fulfilling prophecy. By claiming that its war is similar to earlier U.S. struggles against Nazism and then Stalinism (while ignoring the fact that both Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia were first-rate military powers, a status al-Qaeda neither has nor can achieve), the administration could be preparing the case for war with Iran. Such war would then plunge America into a protracted conflict spanning Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and perhaps also Pakistan.

The culture of fear is like a genie that has been let out of its bottle. It acquires a life of its own -- and can become demoralizing. America today is not the self-confident and determined nation that responded to Pearl Harbor; nor is it the America that heard from its leader, at another moment of crisis, the powerful words "the only thing we have to fear is fear itself"; nor is it the calm America that waged the Cold War with quiet persistence despite the knowledge that a real war could be initiated abruptly within minutes and prompt the death of 100 million Americans within just a few hours. We are now divided, uncertain and potentially very susceptible to panic in the event of another terrorist act in the United States itself.
...
Such fear-mongering, reinforced by security entrepreneurs, the mass media and the entertainment industry, generates its own momentum.
...
That America has become insecure and more paranoid is hardly debatable.
...
The record is even more troubling in the general area of civil rights. The culture of fear has bred intolerance, suspicion of foreigners and the adoption of legal procedures that undermine fundamental notions of justice.
...
In the meantime, the "war on terror" has gravely damaged the United States internationally. For Muslims, the similarity between the rough treatment of Iraqi civilians by the U.S. military and of the Palestinians by the Israelis has prompted a widespread sense of hostility toward the United States in general. It's not the "war on terror" that angers Muslims watching the news on television, it's the victimization of Arab civilians. And the resentment is not limited to Muslims.
...
The events of 9/11 could have resulted in a truly global solidarity against extremism and terrorism. A global alliance of moderates, including Muslim ones, engaged in a deliberate campaign both to extirpate the specific terrorist networks and to terminate the political conflicts that spawn terrorism would have been more productive than a demagogically proclaimed and largely solitary U.S. "war on terror" against "Islamo-fascism." Only a confidently determined and reasonable America can promote genuine international security which then leaves no political space for terrorism.

I talk about perception and the 'war on terrorism' in this post and examine why we are so attracted to terrorism here.

American rationality, RIP

Throughout this month, I will be posting excerpts of my lengthy paper "The War on Terror and the Fire Paradox", as mentioned in this post. Here is one such excerpt...

This is a mock obituary lamenting the loss of sense in America. However, as blogged about here, there seems to be more of a loss of sense in those who take part in politics; the general population in America is fairly politically apathetic, and are actually gaining rationality in some instances. However political intelligence is not up too much.

I must have a fancy for fake or fictional obituaries — a while back I mourned the loss of habeas corpus with a song.

Obituary
In memoriam: American rationality
Born ?, died 11 September 2001 in Washington DC, United States. Rationality, RIP.

In between the Cold War — when so-called communists were threatened and persecuted under a blanket of pseudo-security and patriotism by the government — and the 'war on terror', America enjoyed a relatively good dose of rationality. Whenever wartime came around, the government's ears perked up; the powers and freedoms of the people dumbed down.

Whenever those in the corridors of American power declared some type of war against a largely undefined enemy for the sake of some undeclared goal, rationality was on the scene, defending sense and sensibility — and freedom. Rationality stood for that freedom, and she was violently attacked by politicians who's only duty was to themselves and their false premises for their actions.

Why was she persecuted so? Rationality allowed people to think clearly, even about hyped-up matters. Special interests, inflamed causes, strong powers limiting freedom, lies, and especially fear were her worst enemies. She hated the 'us against them', 'with us or against us' mentality that often surrounded her, but fought until the end for the principles that defined her. Her friends — some of which died, in part, when she did — remember her hopes for governmental transparency, her clear, fluid, logic, and the spirit of common sense she carried with her wherever she went.

Rationality was the ultimate patriot; she stood up for her country, even if that meant standing up against her countrymen. The George W. Bush administration is suspected of her murder. International Islamic extremist terrorists are wanted in connection of conspiracy of her murder. No matter how hard they try, however, she will live on.

Terrorism, and often the fallout of terrorism, is the enemy of rationality. Fear presents as an adversary of rationality. At the time of her death, she was uttering the lyrics of "Won't Get Fooled Again" by The Who, and fighting, intellectually of course, the hordes of ignorant pawns praying for her demise. Rationality was and is like a phoenix. She may die out, but some day she will come back. Let's hope that day comes soon.

Chart of the fire paradox

Throughout this month, I will be posting excerpts of my lengthy paper "The War on Terror and the Fire Paradox", as mentioned in this post. Here is one such excerpt...

Here is a simplified chart showing the cycle of the fire paradox.




See posts relating to...

terrorism

the fire paradox

the war on terrorism

Defining 'terrorism'...

Throughout this month, I will be posting excerpts of my lengthy paper "The War on Terror and the Fire Paradox", as mentioned in this post. Here is one such excerpt...

We spend so much talking about terrorism — including on this very blog — yet the word itself has many definitions. What are they? Which do we follow? Which should we follow? Before we delve further into the hotbed that is terrorism, maybe we should examine what terrorism is.

Definition
'Terrorism', 'terror', 'terrorist'...
The term 'terrorism' originated from the state-led Reign of Terror following the French Revolution. It is commonly applied to political violence by insurgents, that is, unless the terrorism is perpetrated by the state, in which case it is state terrorism. However, terrorism is a generic word with many applications of acts wishing to incite fear, hence my usage of "terrorist insurgents", "insurgent terrorists", or the like, even if the movement is not concrete (most aren’t).

In addition to its practical usage, the philosophical meaning of 'terrorism' is disputed. One delves into semantics and linguistics, as well as politics and psychology. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy's entry for "terrorism" states it as "a highly emotive, pejorative label" (Gilbert). There are two sides to the broad label. Terrorism can be considered as an "unjust war model", like that of 'freedom fighters' or militant rebels, neither as state actors, for a justified reason, or as a crime that is unique only in the fact that it is politically motivated — to cause fear.

The United Nations, the global body, offers several definitions for terrorism on their UNODC website:

The question of a definition of terrorism has haunted the debate among states for decades. A first attempt to arrive at an internationally acceptable definition was made under the League of Nations, but the convention drafted in 1937 never came into existence. The UN Member States still have no agreed-upon definition. Terminology consensus would, however, be necessary for a single comprehensive convention on terrorism, which some countries favour in place of the present 12 piecemeal conventions and protocols.

The lack of agreement on a definition of terrorism has been a major obstacle to meaningful international countermeasures. Cynics have often commented that one state's "terrorist" is another state's "freedom fighter".
...
4. Academic Consensus Definition:
"Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought" (Schmid, 1988).

The standard dictionary definition for "terrorism" is the use of force or violence to accomplish political motives of change, often against an authority; or the state of fear from the use of terrorism. There is disagreement between the dictionaries — whether it be Webster or American Heritage or Oxford or Random House or WordNet — over the status of 'terrorism' as a criminal act. One issue is that conventional militaries and insurgent forces (the most common use for "terrorist") both use violence as a method of change and to create fear in the enemy, or otherwise.

Terrorism is not of conventional war as we think of it, which defies the premise of a ’war on terror’, which is a political term, even more. By definition, there cannot be a war on terror; and if there is, you cannot fight an ideology. You can fight a specific group or movement of individuals, though using the term ’war’ in that case would still be a big stretch, misleading at least. Justification — not legitimacy — defines how we see terrorism, and how the word is used.

Wikipedia's "Definition of terrorism" entry quotes some convenient texts:

Few words are as politically or emotionally charged as terrorism. A 1988 study by the US Army...counted 109 definitions of terrorism that covered a total of 22 different definitional elements. Terrorism expert Walter Laqueur in 1999 also has counted over 100 definitions and concludes that the "only general characteristic generally agreed upon is that terrorism involves violence and the threat of violence".
...
The Oxford English Dictionary defines terrorism as "a policy intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted; the employment of methods of intimidation; the fact of terrorising or condition of being terrorised."

Webster's New International Dictionary defines terrorism as the "act of terrorizing, or state of being terrorized; specif.: a The system of the Reign of Terror. b A mode of governing, or of opposing government, by intimidation. c Any policy of intimidation."

The definition of the term in the Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics (2nd edition) begins: "Term with no agreement amongst government or academic analysts, but almost invariably used in a pejorative sense, most frequently to describe life-threatening actions perpetrated by politically motivated self-appointed sub-state groups."

The American Heritage Dictionary defines terrorism as "The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a person or an organized group against people or property with the intention of intimidating or coercing societies or governments, often for ideological or political reasons."

The Online Etymology Dictionary refers to terrorism as the "systematic use of terror as a policy" and describes the word's origin in the specific sense of "government intimidation during the Reign of Terror in France".

Random House via Dictionary.com:

ter·ror·ism –noun
1. the use of violence and threats to intimidate or coerce, esp. for political purposes.
2. the state of fear and submission produced by terrorism or terrorization.
3. a terroristic method of governing or of resisting a government.
[Origin: 1785–95; terror + -ism]

Encyclopedia Britannica defines "terrorism" as:

the systematic use of violence to create a general climate of fear in a population and thereby to bring about a particular political objective. Terrorism has been practiced by political organizations with both rightist and leftist objectives, by nationalistic and religious groups, by revolutionaries, and even by state institutions such as armies, intelligence services, and police.

A tale of two viewpoints

Throughout this month, I will be posting excerpts of my lengthy paper "The War on Terror and the Fire Paradox", as mentioned in this post. Here is one such excerpt...

From the White House press briefings to the Mujahideen spin machine, there’s one thing both sides have in common, besides exploiting their own people’s fears and insecurities and irrationality: propaganda.

Jihad for the masses: Mujahideen
The following is an article called "Fundamentalism" from a jihadist website of a group who call themselves Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. This Mujahideen group was active at its inception during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan that spurred the Taliban, which the US meddled in, and in the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir. The groups advocates jihad and that Muslims do their duty and fight against the menace — whether it be Zionist or western satanic groups.

We are under threat from the Fundamentalists!
The Fundamentalists are a threat to the worldwide peace mission!
We should unite in our efforts against [the] Fundamentalists!
There is no existence of such a thing in Islam called Fundamentalism!
If the wave of Fundamentalism is not stopped,
nobody will be saved from becoming it’s next target.
…
The word terror has been mentioned which is used today as a swear against Muslims. Therefore, those Muslims who have gained Islamic strength are branded as terrorists. What need is there for the Muslims to be ashamed of this swear? Allah (sw) has ordered the Muslims to terrorize their enemies, who are also the enemies of Allah (sw). Whosoever will fulfill this obligation will be classed as a terrorist. So to be a terrorist is a source of blessing and not shame. To cast terror upon the enemies of Allah (sw) is an act of worship and not an act of crime. Muslims should not be hesitant in fulfilling this obligation.
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In conclusion, Muslims are not being branded as Fundamentalists because of a major change, they are being branded because of returning back to the roots of their Religion and this title is a blessing for the Muslims.

Political statement in the aftermath of terrorist attack
The following is an excerpt from a statement by President George W. Bush following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and in Pennsylvania on the morning of 11 September 2001.

Good evening. Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. The victims were in airplanes, or in their offices; secretaries, businessmen and women, military and federal workers; moms and dads, friends and neighbors. Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror.

The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning, huge structures collapsing, have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness, and a quiet, unyielding anger. These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed; our country is strong.

A great people has been moved to defend a great nation. Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America. These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve.

America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining.

See also "Why are we obsessed with terrorism?"

technorati tags: Mujahideen, press, communications, bush, fundamentalism, jihad, 9/11, terrorism, muslim, united+states

Multi-voice poem on terrorism...

Throughout this month, I will be posting excerpts of my lengthy paper "The War on Terror and the Fire Paradox", as mentioned in this post. Here is one such excerpt... A multi-voice poem relating to the psychological and personal effects of terror.

'For a minute there, I lost myself'
They attack
I am scared
My government will protect me,
They say.

He felt scared
He felt afraid.
How could his great country,
The most powerful on the face of this heavenly earth,
Be attacked; brought to its knees?

Will I be next?
Will the terrorists kill me?
Why do they hate us?

Who is really threatening my way of life?
Is it the government, those claiming to fight the terrorists;
The terrorists themselves, the evil;
Or me —
Could it be me?
Could I be caving in to the politics of fear?

If he knew fear,
He knew irrationality.
He knew terror,
He knows terror.

In the wake of the attack,
I lost my rationality
I lost my mind,
I was scared
I let fear rule me.
I let the government rule me,
Using my fear of the terrorists and creating their own.
For a minute there, I lost myself.*


* The climactic point of the Radiohead song, "Karma Police".
See also "Why are we obsessed with terrorism?"

Image is everything? Perception and the 'war on terror'

Throughout this month, I will be posting excerpts of my lengthy paper "The War on Terror and the Fire Paradox", as mentioned in this post. Here is one such excerpt...

Image is everything? Perception and the 'war on terror', in their eyes
How do human rights and other abuses committed in the name of the war on terror tie into the terrorism? Perception: how the world sees the United States and, most importantly, how the moderates in the Muslim world view the US. Instead of just angering moderate Muslim communities — in the US and abroad — the United States should choose policy decisions that limit the perception that the US is after (all) Muslims, which is exactly what the radicals want the moderates to think. In addition, tying ventures like the one in Iraq to any counterterrorism operation only increases the confusion and gives all counterterrorism a bad name.

Sadly, because the United States failed in its plans to bring stability to Iraq following the 2003 invasion, which was under false pretenses, there is now more than ever a need for counterterrorism in Iraq and the wider Middle East. Radicals have been able to garner more popular support from the majority-moderate population. The United States' occupation and perceived targeting of Islam is their scapegoat and rallying cry; the US's scapegoat are the extremists and allegedly extremist-supporting states like Iran.

Not only has the failure in Iraq created more Mid-East instability, it has allowed countries like Iran, a Shia-majority semi-democratic, semi-theocratic country, to enjoy an unprecedented power and hand in their neighbors affairs. At the same time, America is seen as an occupier — a true statement — but also a source of great evil. Islamic extremists see the US as evil; the US sees the Islamic extremists as evil.

Overall, the US has generally refrained from using terrorism — i.e. fear of violence in opposition to gain political power and control — in its efforts to 'win over' the support of the Iraqi people, or scare them into submission. However, things like secret CIA prisons and detention centers like the one at Guantanamo Bay, and the torture tied to many related operations, has hurt the American image abroad and diminished political capital at home.

There have been numerous polls analyzing the popularity of the US. One such poll was created by the BBC, GlobeScan, and PIPA. The global view of the United States is not very positive, and support is eroding. The overall average, from 25 countries polled, resulted in a negative outlook of US influence of about 50 percent; positive outlook was only a bit over 30 percent.


The survey raised some questions, as the BBC's Marcus Jonathan wrote the day the poll's results were released — following President Bush's annual State of the Union address.

This poll underscores conclusions drawn from several other surveys - that anti-Americanism is on the rise, and the more the US flexes its hard power - the more it deploys troops abroad or talks tough diplomatically - the more it seems to weaken its ability to influence the world.

Maybe Washington will bounce back. America's image improved markedly in the post-Vietnam era. But then there was still the Cold War to keep America's allies on-side.
…
Comparable surveys suggest that there is still strong support around the world for the values enshrined in US society. But it looks as though America itself is seen to be living up to those values less and less.

As a result, America's soft power - its ability to influence people in other countries by the force of example and by the perceived legitimacy of its policies - is weakening.

And in a turbulent, globalising world, where the US - rightly or wrongly - is associated by many with the disruptive effects of globalisation, soft power matters more than ever.
…
At root is the problem of legitimacy.
…
It is the Bush administration's handling of the issue that is reflected in this BBC poll; not the policy options themselves. These are complex.
...
The US undoubtedly has an "image-problem", and there are worrying signs that this is having an impact upon the administration's ability to get the policy outcomes that it wants.

One of the wisest writers on these issues is Joseph S Nye, now Dean of the John F Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He is in many ways "Mr Soft Power", having written and theorised about the phenomenon for many years.

He has long-argued that Americans need to better understand how their policies appear to others.

"To communicate effectively," he has written, "Americans must first learn to listen."

This opinion poll, then, represents a powerful argument for those seeking to make the case that Washington should listen more and try to win over its friends as much by persuasion and force of example as by firm actions and tough rhetoric.

The US government turns a blind eye to regimes that contradict what Bush administration defines as American values (freedom, etc.), and, at the same time, disown democratic countries who disagree with the US's views in their self-gratifying crusade for 'freedom' and against 'terrorism'. This is similar to the politics of the Cold War: 'us against them', 'with us or against us'; having a general, evil enemy at home, which garnered political capital, and supporting regimes with contradictory policies abroad. These foreign policy contradictions, coupled with America striving for authority in any area it think relates to terrorism, make some very angry.

During the Cold War, America was battling 'communism'; nowadays it is fighting 'terrorism'. They could say it is sunny on a cloudy day (or vice versa) and, sadly, many people would believe them. Unconditional support for Israel has not helped others' perceptions of the United States either, not least in the Muslim world, where the terrorist insurgents we are talking about come from.

All of the aforementioned tie into how others view America. A negative PR has strong implications for how US policy affects others. Ultimately, a poor image allows terrorist insurgents to recruit more, or at least get more public support, at a time when too many in the Muslim world think the US is against them — there is, in their eyes at least, little evidence to the contrary.

See also "Why are we obsessed with terrorism?". And a post on the 'fire paradox'.

Why are we obsessed with terrorism?

Throughout this month, I will be posting excerpts of my lengthy paper "The War on Terror and the Fire Paradox", as mentioned in this post. Here is one such excerpt...

One underlying cause for the terrorism/counterterrorism culture is the public’s obsession with terrorism.

Do you want the ultimate in political change tactics, whether it is terrorism or counterterrorism that causes that change, using fear as a tool? To be able to do so, one must first understand why people are so drawn to terrorism.

Global health, the environment, climate change, poverty, AIDS, water, and other issues are far more pressing than terrorism. It kills relatively few and should be minor in the eyes of the public, right?

Like plane crashes, terrorism is unpredictable, sporadic, spontaneous, sudden, often human-caused, mysterious-seeming; and, unlike plane crashes, unscientific. It has no rationale — or so observers think.

People's obsession with terrorism helps explain why politicians use it against their own people — whether in original terrorism or a spin on the original (i.e. some form of counterterrorism) — and why extremist rebels use it in the first place.

Here is a (partial) list of why people, and their news media, are so attracted to terrorism:

Abstract in nature (like politics and religion);

People cannot grapple with terror like other health/sociological threats;

It is political; ties into human emotion and politics;

Violence and fear (like some crime stories);

Personal attachments (could this happen to me?);

Some sort of sexiness (from all the hype);

Shocking, spontaneous;

Deep connection to inner-psyche (exact cause is unknown, explaining speculation);

Does not develop (like a disease or something like that), unpredictable (things that happen suddenly produce more attraction, coverage);

Human interest (goes psychologically deep);

Accomplishes motives of fear and attention, like martyrs do;

The act of understanding why people use terrorism, or trying to leads to more obsession with terrorism itself;

Superficially evil, perfect villain, but more layers lie beneath (like with an onion);

The change it creates, human obsession with change or lack thereof;

I.e., deals with change — a constant source of human interest;

Unlike many other crimes;

I.e., often committed with no specificity (can have a target, but no intent on target like with a common murder, for instance, in which which the killer has a reason for the death of the specify person they kill);

Just the word "terrorism" is extremely political and emotional, holding strong connotations depending on one's subjective, often political view of the word and the related semantics.

Work in progress... 'The War on Terror and the Fire Paradox'

I am currently working on a lengthy paper on the 'fire paradox' and the 'war on terror'.

Excerpts (not yet edited; may sound choppy):
Current United States policy on managing terrorism and insurgency is a fire paradox of sorts. Why many current counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency, policies only make it all worse: the US Global War on Terror and the proliferation of the radical, fundamentalist Islamic ideology in a terrorist insurgency.

Whether fighting the foreign occupiers in Iraq, fighting the 'western menace' from within its own borders, or rallying on some other jihadist front, there is a new kind of terrorism and no one seems to know what to define it as. Call it an insurgency against the West, call it a rebellious movement, call it pure terrorism, call it a fundamentalist wave in the Muslim world...
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They fear the west; westerners fear them. The middlemen? The governments of the West, namely of the US, and the extremist Islamic groups.
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From the White House press briefings to the Mujahideen spin machine, there’s one thing both sides have in common, besides exploiting their own people’s fears and insecurities and irrationality: propaganda.
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It all ties into politics and public perception. This kind of terrorism cannot exist without a great deal of public support, and its roots tie deeply into societal conditions and political relations.
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One underlying cause for the terrorism/counterterrorism culture is the public’s obsession with terrorism.
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After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks (9/11), Americans defied the terrorists, at least in the way the government wanted, by showing their patriotism and continuing their American way of life. After all, the terrorists attacked because they were angry at the US`s freedom, right?

Yet as soon as the Bush White House noted how easily people could be controlled and manipulated for political capital, the guise of a war on terror was put up. There’s no vast conspiracy, but the Bush administration did use 9/11 as an excuse for its many following endeavors in fronts in its global war on terrorism (GWOT).