Turkish incursion in Iraq

Threats abound as Turkey continues its assault against the Kurdish rebel group, the PKK, based in the relatively stable Kurdish area of Iraq.

Turkey can use different tools for fighting the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, including diplomacy, economic and military means as a last resort, [Turkish Foreign Minister] Babacan told reporters. ``All options are on the table.''
...
Babacan called for ``friends' support'' against the PKK, a separatist group, designated terrorists by the U.S. and the European Union, fighting Turkey from bases in northern Iraq.

The US cautioned the Turks not to meddle in Iraq's affairs; but Turkey stated it was only defending itself after recent — and long-running — terrorist attacks by the PKK. Iran has used this incident to play the 'good guy' card, championing diplomacy and its neighbor's right to security, while making America look all the more foolish for telling Turkey it cannot fight its own 'war on terror'. Opinions remained mixed. Turkey says that fighting is the only option left — which tells us a lot about the (failure of) diplomacy in matters relating to Iraq, and not just with America's foes (Turkey is an ally).

6 years later: looking back on 9/11

It's been six years since an act that changed modern history and the world as we knew it. Acts of terrorism were committed on the morning of 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington, DC, and, as it turned out, Pennsylvania. Now, I'm sure you have heard this all and have heard it again, but the political and social effects created by 9/11 have been, suffice to say, enormous. It led to the invasion of entire countries, an international 'war' being declared, the decline in popularity of numerous politicians, the death of many civilians and soldiers, and a shift in the perspectives of both the Muslim world and the West.

A poll recently released said that many Americans will do nothing special or different on this day — not even watch the news to see what's going on in the world. Considering their nation's place in the world and their fortunate socioeconomic placement, world events is something many Americans are quite ignorant about. I try not to be one of those ignorant Americans.

I know it sounds cheesy, but in one way or another, 11 September is always a day of reflection for me, a time to remember times past. I remember the morning of 9/11. I had just left the dentist's office after my six month checkup. I turned on the radio and heard that there had been a plane crash, black smoke, New York, World Trade Center. It didn't click in my mind until a little while later. Soon, the towers fell, and the entire world seemed to be in shock. CNN replayed the video for what felt like weeks, immediately a 'war on terror' was declared. I remember how everyone displayed a flag — on their car window, in front of their house, on their clothes. Everyone was soaking in a sea of patriotism that would soon turn into anguish and, for some, war-mongering despair and an opportunistic outlook. Not only did companies capitalize off of that patriotism; politicians did too. I, like most others, went along with President Bush until I realized you cannot fight terrorists by invading nations, implementing poor policies, thus counter-intuitively breeding more terrorism.

Here are some of the posts from In Perspective I've picked out that are especially relevant to this day:

Warping facts and rewriting history: 9/11 conspiracy theories [here]

A tale of two viewpoints [here]

A look back to a moment in history: 9/11 [here]

Course of action: some GWOT recommendations [here]

"Freedom isn't free" [here]

There's a clash of something(s), but what? [here]

Osama Bin Laden can continue his little video messages for all I care. What he should know is that, eventually, he will be brought to justice — in actuality or in principle — for masterminding the killings of thousands of Americans on 9/11, and many more in other horrible incidents. He is one person who will go down in history for what he really is: bigoted, militant, murderous scum. His followers receive just as much sympathy (i.e. none) from me for their 'cause' as their twisted leader.

technorati tags: 9/11, 9-11, september+11

Why America's Mideast military aid is bad news

Countering the spread of Iran and terrorism in the Middle East is tricky business. That's why the Bush administration has decided to give Israel US$30 billion, Egypt $13 billion, and Saudi Arabia [see post], Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and UAE a shared $20 billion in a new arms deal (BBC).

George and Condi's ill-reasoned idea
"Rice says Mideast military aid will counter Qaeda" (Reuters). Yes, throwing money at terror-sponsoring states like Saudi Arabia will surely help defeat al-Qaeda... I wouldn't expect any finer logic from the Bush administration.

How will this military aid help stem the spread of Iran's influence? Won't it make them just want to bolster their military strength? So far the aid doesn't seem to be promoting stability; it is only invoking cries of favoritism and, if anything, destabilizing the fragile state of Mideast diplomacy.

Is instability the new 'stability'?
In some ways I see how this military aid can bring stability, but only if it's used in the right way. Does anyone honestly think Israel or Saudi Arabia will use this military aid in a way that reduces tensions and terrorism? Begin on the policy level, then move on to aid; you don't approve a budget before you see what you're budgeting and the planned end product, right?

America needs assurance these military gifts will be used in a positive manner. Not only that, but we've seen what military force does in the Middle East (and elsewhere). Force is countered by more force, and sometimes breeds terrorism and destabilizes relations. Military force led to increased support for Hezbollah following its skirmish with Israel last summer. Force led to the Iraq war and to — decades ago — the rise of state-sponsored militant groups like what became the Taliban and Hamas. Thinking that military force will bring about peace is the same kind of twisted logic implemented by America and other nations that has resulted in the disaster that is much of the Mid-East.

Buying allies
The NYT reported about the White House's request that Congress approve this aid package. It also touched upon the issue of whether this is such a good idea.

Mr. Burns insisted that the arms package isn’t an attempt to trade weapons for a more cooperative Saudi policy toward the Maliki government in Baghdad.

“There are no formal quid pro quos in this, but it figures that we would want our friends to be supportive of Iraq,” he said.

So the US is buying support... but not really? If Saudi Arabia was a true friend it wouldn't need billions in military aid to keep it a non-enemy. Non-enemy doesn't necessarily equal friend either.

'B' in Rhetoric, 'F' in Logic
Just by looking at history as a guide — throwing even common sense aside (not Bush's strong point anyways) — is even the Bush White House too blind to recognize the follies it is still committing? It's almost like giving disturbed children guns, when you know perfectly well nothing good will come of it. It also makes the US look worse. The charge of favoritism is yet another thing states like Iran and groups that use terrorism will certainly use against the United States, especially since it is so publicly and so largely supporting the 'Zionist enemy' in its quest for world domination over Muslims (their thoughts, not mine). The last thing America needs is more bad PR.

I really do hope Rice is right when she says this deal will not destabilize the Middle East. But a glimpse at reality can bring about quite a different view than the one seen by the secretary of state. Over $60 billion is also a lot of money to give away, considering it probably won't be spent wisely, plus many of the recipients are human rights-abusing, malevolent regional actors. Is this their reward?

Continuing the trend of buying Saudi Arabia's half-hearted support is not the wisest of choices. How will they react, though, when America takes away their allowance? With more terrorism, perhaps...

Also, what will Congress say? It's they who carry the purse.

Reposted. Still in California.

The differences between Brown and Bush

Brown might be pro-US, but he is no Blair.

The world media still seems to be buzzing about the meeting between British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and US President George Bush. While they seemed to agree on many points, their disagreements — no matter how subtle; often on big issues — are coming to light. Bush views Iraq as the central front in the United States-led 'war on terror', whereas Brown sees Afghanistan as where the real battle against terror is and should be.

Iraq is no doubt full of terrorism, but only because of sectarian violence and foreign occupation. There are many factions, and so many battles. Terror networks via militia exist in both Afghanistan and Iraq and reach even to the national level (e.g. allegations of Saudi Arabia and Iran fueling some groups). But Afghanistan is the original site of the GWOT and the occupation there has the backing of the UN and NATO. Iraq, on the other hand, is much less straightforward and, contrasting with the reality of the occupation in Afghanistan, one can make the case that foreign soldiers being there does little in the fight against international terrorism.

Iraq is becoming a hotbed because of the war (blowback) — both the civil one and the one started in 2003 by the US and its allies; Afghanistan would be a terrorist haven regardless. Some view this blunt difference in priorities as Brown's way of appeasing Britain and wider Europe, vehemently opposed to the Iraq war.

Also on Iraq, Brown said that the United Kingdom will stick to plan and withdrawal troops regardless of whether the United States stays. However it does plan to stay there until the job is done. While the leaders are stressing unity, the fact that Britain intends to go its separate way from the US in Iraq is major. The British PM also opposes the language of a 'war' on terror and thinks a military fight against terrorism is not enough. I agree.

Another good move (away from Bush) Brown made was on terrorism. He rightly described terrorism as a "crime", compared to Bush's view that it is an act of pure evil and we must stop it even if we destroy the constitutional foundation of America in the progress and kill many. Brown is not the politicizer of terrorism his Atlantic counterpart is famous for being; I believed he handled the attempted attacks in Britain earlier this summer well, from both a political and a policy viewpoint. He also is right to be worried and want to take action on climate change; Bush couldn't care less.

In politics message, and thus language, is everything. Bush and Blair managed to illustrate their contrasting views pretty well without looking like they oppose each other absolutely.

[Bush and Brown's] words subtly illustrated, not policy differences, but their own policy priorities and approaches.

President Bush's language was, as always, full of phrases like "the war against extremists and radicals" in Iraq and around the world.

Prime Minister Brown deliberately described terrorism as a "crime", in an effort perhaps to demystify it and make it easier for everyone around the world, Muslims included, to oppose it.

And he tried to paint a more complex picture of Iraq by differentiating the factions - the Sunni/Shia split, the "involvement of Iran", the "large number of al-Qaeda terrorists".

However, as Mr Bush said, both agreed that this was "akin to the Cold War".
...
He called Afghanistan the "front line against terrorism," an honour normally assigned by Mr Bush to Iraq.

The British prime minister also referred a couple of times to the issue of "climate change". Mr Bush did not.

The point about Iraq and Afghanistan is that these are policies that Mr Brown inherited. This relationship has not yet been tested in the development of new ones.

The most difficult one could be Iran. Further sanctions are expected to be discussed at the UN in September but if there is no progress in getting Iran to suspend uranium enrichment, there could be pressure within the Bush administration for military action to be taken before the president leaves office in January 2009.

That would indeed be a test to see if the US and UK stayed together.

Brown also seems to be much more serious on humanitarian issues like Darfur than Bush, who limits his action on such issues to mere rhetoric (unless such issues might relate to his fight against terror, like in Somalia, then he'll even agree to indirectly work with/help the dreaded North Korea). Brown takes a special interest in world poverty and the plight of many in Africa; Bush cares only if terrorists may be involved, and even then the focus is not on the possible source of terrorism support: poverty, plight, and insecurity. Africa has plenty of that, and the Islamist extremists are taking advantage of that.

With all this talk of unity and strong ties, the leaders of America and the UK seem to have plenty of issues on which they disagree.

Course of action: some GWOT recommendations

This is the conclusion, for now, of "The War on Terror and the Fire Paradox" blog post series.

So how should America go about its 'war' against terrorism? The root cause of terrorism needs ample understanding, thus helping in the fight, or what could be described as a fight, more against the source of terrorism than its effects. An issue with counterterrorism efforts abroad is that cooperation — if not total coordination — with the local government at the site of the operation is needed, as well as with others who may be affected.

The 9/11 Commission, set up over a year after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks upon the United States, gave a handful of major recommendations for an American course of action in the global battle against radical Islamic terrorism. "But the enemy is not just "terrorism," some generic evil. This vagueness blurs the strategy. The catastrophic threat at this moment in history is more specific. It is the threat posed by Islamist terrorism — especially the al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology." (p.362)

The 9/11 Commission Report also states education as a major preventative effort in states susceptible to breeding or attracting terrorism, as is economic development aid (pp.377-379). In addition, the report stresses a positive image of the United States in the Muslim world in order to allow the US to be seen as a legitimate and positive force, and not hinder its operations with governments wishing to help in battling extremism (pp.376-377).

Not only does the transnational flow of terrorists and their radical movements need to be halted, but a helpful combination of good PR (but not propaganda), economic agreements (but not unreasonable concessions), and open-channel diplomacy (but not a free-for-all) should be kept with states suspected of harboring — or even directly or indirectly supporting — terrorism. Countries like Syria, which is a major hub for insurgents entering Iraq, could help in the fight against terrorism if they were not shunned by the US. In Syria's case*, good relations with America could even bring the state further from more devious states like Iran. Lest we forget, terrorism is a problem for other governments too, even 'evil' ones. Most every state in the Middle East and North Africa fears terrorism of the radical Islamic persuasion.

The US cannot fight its war alone either. It needs to be willing to reach out to friends and foes alike, observing the greater good while still keeping on the ethical side of things. Guantanamo Bay does little in helping the war on terrorism, except in political ways for the Bush administration — e.g. when a suspect 'confesses' to some sort of scary-sounding terrorist plot, it raises political support for the White House. Gitmo is a negative symbol in the war on terror and looks bad from close allies like the United Kingdom as well as disgruntled Middle Easterners who already mad enough at America — things like Gitmo may well push them over the edge and radicalize the population, thus playing into the extremists' hands. Not to mention the fact it's a legal and human rights disgrace, an example of how freedom suffers at the hands of those who fight in the name of security (freedom v. security). These extremists resort to big measures to get public opinion on their side; the US is only helping them by providing perfect rallying cries: 'the imperial occupiers, who kill your brothers and bombed your village wish to harm us further', etc.

As Joseph Nye points out in a Foreign Affairs article from May/June 2004, you cannot just use military power in the 'war on terror' — perception matters*, whether in the eyes of allies or enemies. Allies must see the United States' foreign policy as legitimate, other must see it as non-threatening. Anti-Americanism is more serious than some in Washington think, and it’s high time to take actions to limit the resent against America.

References

Ferguson, Niall. Colossus: the Rise and Fall of the American Empire. New York: Penguin, 2004.

Ikenberry, G. John. “America’s Imperial Ambition”. Foreign Affairs Sept/Oct 2002.

Nye, Joseph S., Jr. “The Decline of America's Soft Power: Why Washington Should Worry”. Foreign Affairs May/June 2004.
---. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: PublicAffairs, 2005.

United States. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report. By Thomas H. Kean, et al. New York: W.W. Norton, 2004.
* = a post from this blog

The final throes of the insurgency: two situations

Firstly, a short-term operation that looks to have an end and objective: the fight against Islamic militants who have taken hold of Islamabad's Red Mosque in Pakistan.

Pakistan's army says an operation to flush out militants from a mosque in Islamabad is in its final stages - 24 hours after troops stormed the complex

Of course the impact the Red Mosque fiasco will have on Musharraf's already, ahem, tarnished presidency will be interesting. The end of the siege, however, is in sight.


Secondly, Bush is asking for more time for the US military operation in Iraq as more and more Americans convert to 'defeatism' every day. Of course the 'surge' will finally start working and under Bush's wise leadership America will win the winnable "war on terror". No true benchmarks or oversight is needed — setting an "artificial" deadline would show that America has lost. It just needs more time, hmm...

Republicans are getting very antsy. However the chance of both parties working together — which seems like a foreign idea in the polarized political climate of today's Washington — is small (at best). Iraq has become the issue, and neither party has much of a solution, yet alone unity on it.

President George W. Bush on Tuesday brushed aside the criticism of fellow Republicans over Iraq and demanded the U.S. Congress allow his troop buildup more time to work.

Bush ruled out an immediate change in strategy, even though prominent Republican lawmakers like Indiana Sen. Richard Lugar have broken ranks and called for him to shift course on Iraq.

Defiant in the face of a frustrated American public and Congress, Bush said the 28,000 additional troops he ordered into Iraq have not been in place long enough to gauge results because the final wave arrived only last month.

The president defended his policy ahead of the release as early as on Thursday of an interim report expected to show mixed progress by the Iraqi government in meeting U.S. security and political benchmarks. The report, which is due by Sunday, is bound to fuel further debate about the war.
...
A new USA Today/Gallup poll showed on Tuesday that more than seven in 10 Americans favor withdrawing nearly all U.S troops from Iraq by April. Sixty-two percent said sending U.S. troops to Iraq was a mistake, the first time that number topped 60 percent in that poll.

The surge had time to work. Hell, even I gave it a chance. But Baghdad's security situation is as dire as ever. The "green zone" — normally a US-occupied oasis of security in a sea of violence — is becoming more red by the day. However we have overlooked some of Iraq's successes. Not all of Iraq is as bad as the wider central and southern regions and that is good — American, British, and other troops have done a fine job there and it's been overlooked. But the wider picture reveals an Iraq in turmoil at a nationally and often at a local level. Conclusion: A politically/strategically bottomless, downward-spiraling war with mixed (negative) support at home and abroad.

Oh yeah, and

Meanwhile, the White House threatened to veto the defense policy bill senators were debating, if it is amended to set a withdrawal date. The administration also threatened a veto of the bill for a provision it already contains, giving new rights to detainees at the military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

US and UK terror alerts

First of all, happy first of July.

 

There has been a string of suspected terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom, the first of which was allegedly stopped before it occured in London (police found explosives, etc., in two cars). Just a bit after the London discovery a Jeep full of gas cylenders rammed into the terminal of an airport in Glasgow, Scotland. Inital reports of the Glasgow car ramming made it sound like the car was already on fire before it hit the airport. Now that appears not to be true. It is unknown whether these events are related or whether they are part of a wider network of attempted and planned terror attacks by an al-Qaeda cell or sub-group. There are possible additional plots too:

Glasgow - Burning car driven into doors of Glasgow Airport on Saturday. Two people arrested at scene

London - Two car bombs that failed to detonate found in central London on Friday

Paisley - Controlled explosion carried out on car at Royal Alexandra Hospital

Cheshire - Man and woman arrested overnight on M6, then taken to London for questioning

Liverpool - Man arrested. Police searching two addresses

Houston - Police searching houses in village near Glasgow

Newcastle-under-Lyme - Police searching house in Staffordshire

See here for the alert as it pertains to US national security. Remember, however, though these plots seem serious, and they are, no doubt politicians will try to get the best of us at times when we are most suceptable to the fear and terror these attacks are supposed to create. The UK is at the highest level of its terror alert.  Brace yourselves.

 

I'l still on vacation of course, but had a bit of downtime and felt the urge to hop on the net since I can (darn you wireless internet access!). I couldn't resist blogging at least a bit. Anyway, more soon.

Poor excuse for Iraq occupation

(The name of) Osama bin Laden was used for another political ploy as President George Bush once again affirmed Iraq as the central battleground of the "war on terror".

Bush's speech...was part of a White House campaign in recent weeks to portray the violence in Iraq as primarily a function of al-Qaeda -- and playing down the internal divisions within Iraq. The apparent hope is to regain some political support for an endeavor that has become deeply unpopular among the American people, since fighting terrorists is seen as more acceptable than policing a civil war. Bush on Wednesday said the "most destructive" force trying to sink the U.S. strategy in Iraq is al-Qaeda.

Contrary to what the White House says, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is not a danger to the US homeland. AQI is a relatively small ("Numerous estimates show that the group called “al Qaeda in Iraq” (AQI) comprises only 5 to 10 per cent of the Sunni insurgents’ forces.") and fractured group overrepresented in power by the daunting calls by politicians on both sides of the aisle for a fight against it.

How long will politicians be able to say the word 'terrorism' and scare the public into submission for their policies?

Here's part of a good article on Iraq from Prospect Magazine by Robert Dreyfuss (I know, it's a long quote):

To understand why it is a mistake to assume the worst [about troop withdrawal from Iraq], let’s begin with the most persistent, Bush-fostered fear about post-occupation Iraq: that al Qaeda or other Islamic extremists will seize control once America departs, or that al Qaeda will establish a safe haven in a rump, lawless “Sunnistan.”
...
The doomsayers’ second great fear is that the Sunni-Shia sectarian civil war could escalate, reaching near-genocidal levels and sucking in Iraq’s neighbours. But let’s look at the countervailing factors—and there are many. First, the US is doing little, if anything, to restrain ethnic cleansing, either in Baghdad neighbourhoods or Sunni and Shia enclaves surrounding the capital. Indeed, under its current policy, the US is arming and training one side in a civil war by bolstering the Shia-controlled army and police.
...
Second, although battle lines are hardening and militias on both sides are becoming self-sustaining, the civil war is limited by physical constraints. Neither the Sunnis nor the Shias have much in the way of armour or heavy weapons—tanks, major artillery, helicopters and the like. ... Presuming neither side gets its hands on heavy weapons, once you take US forces out of the equation, the Sunnis and Shias would ultimately reach an impasse.

Even if post-occupation efforts to create a new political compact among Iraqis fail, the most likely outcome is, again, a bloody Sunni-Shia stalemate, accompanied by continued ethnic cleansing in mixed areas. But that, of course, is no worse than the path Iraq is already on.

A third countervailing factor is that neither Shia Iran nor the Sunni Arab countries would want to risk a regional conflagration by providing their Iraqi proxies with the heavy weapons that would enable them to wage offensive operations. The only power that could worsen Iraq’s sectarian civil war is the US. Washington continues to arm and train the Shias, although so far it has resisted pleas to provide Iraq’s Shia-led army and police with heavy weapons, armour and an air force. Only if that policy changed, and the US began to create a true Shia army in Iraq, would the Sunni Arab states feel compelled to build up Iraq’s Sunni paramilitary militias into something resembling a traditional army.

Thus even if we assume that Iraq’s parties cannot achieve some sort of reconciliation as the US withdraws, an American pullout is hardly guaranteed to unleash chaos. On the contrary, each year since 2003 that American troops have remained in Iraq, the violence has escalated steadily.

The third great fear about a post-occupation Iraq—although it gets less attention than it deserves—is the possibility of a crisis triggered by a Kurdish power grab in Kirkuk, the city at the heart of Iraq’s northern oil fields. Since 2003, the Kurds have been systematically ethnic cleansing, packing Kirkuk with Kurds, kidnapping or driving out Arab residents (many of them settled there by Saddam), and stacking the city council with Kurdish partisans.
...
It’s hard to exaggerate the dangers inherent in a Kurdish grab for Kirkuk. Such a move would inflame Iraq’s Arab population (Sunnis and Shias), impinge on other minorities (including Turkmen and Christians) and provoke an outburst of ethnic cleansing in the city. Iraq’s two-sided civil war would become three-sided.
...
Conversely, under the US occupation the Kurds apparently feel emboldened to press their advantage in Kirkuk.
...
Not only is the worst-case scenario far from a sure thing in the event of an American withdrawal, but there is also a best-case scenario. Precisely because the idea of all-out civil war and a regional blow-up involving Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are so horrifying, the political forces inside and outside Iraq have many incentives not to go there.

And though things have gone horrendously awry since the 2003 invasion, there are many factors that could provide the glue to put Humpty back together again. Contrary to the conventional wisdom in Washington, Iraq is not a make-believe state cobbled together after the first world war, but a nation united by the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, just as the Nile unites Egypt. Historically, the vast majority of Iraqis have not primarily identified themselves as Sunnis or Shias. Of course, as the civil war escalates, more Iraqis are identifying by sect. But it is not too late to resurrect some of the comity that once existed. The war is not a conflict between all Sunnis and all Shias, but a violent clash of extremist paramilitary armies. Most Iraqis do not support the extremists on either side. According to a poll conducted in June 2006 by the International Republican Institute, “78 per cent of Iraqis, including a majority of Shias, opposed the division of Iraq along ethnic and sectarian lines.”

What most Iraqis do seem to want, according to numerous polls, is for American forces to leave. Even within the current, skewed Iraqi political system, a majority of Iraq’s parliament supports a US withdrawal.
...
This shared desire could be another crucial force in helping maintain the integrity of Iraq. The catch-22 of Iraqi politics is that any Iraqi government created or supported by the US is instantly suspect in Iraqi eyes. By the same token, a nationalist government that succeeds in ushering US forces out of Iraq would have overwhelming support from most Iraqis on most sides of the conflict. With that support, such a government might be able to make the difficult compromises—like amending the constitution to give minority protections to Sunnis—that the current government has been unable or unwilling to make, but that most observers believe are crucial to any lasting political settlement.

Soft is good, or why ambivalence wins over coercion

America is attacking the symptoms rather than the problem — the source — of terrorism. To explain the faults of America’s counterterrorism policy, in regards to its foreign policy, one must observe what exactly that policy is. To operate in a more stable power balance, the US must employ soft power — which Joseph Nye calls "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion" — rather than the military coerciveness and saber rattling of hard power.

The origins of terrorism are also an issue to be studied. As far as counterterrorism’s woes go, the fire paradox is a problem and side-effect; soft power might just be part of the solution. Perception is a key element in this soft power, and a component in the fire paradox. The perception of America’s counterterrorism efforts abroad makes them all the more futile.

Pros and cons of Israel's Gaza raid

Here we go again: another Israeli excursion
Judging by previous experiences, how can Israel expect these raids to make things better? It will just make Palestinians more annoyed and spark even more terrorism. But since the matter is hardly void of opinion, here I present a list of "Pros" and "Cons" of the Israeli raid of Gaza.

Pros:

Helps with Israeli security*

Gets rid of some terrorists

Weakens Hamas*

Good for domestic politics; makes Olmert not seem soft

Secures Israeli military personnel

Increases power and leverage in future negotiations

Cons:

Creates more Palestinian strife

Kills, injures, and destroys

Weakens support abroad, save the US

Puts semi-stable Palestine unity government in disarray

Creates more terrorism (see fire paradox)

Does not accomplish mission and objectives*

Cuts chances of diplomacy

Infringes on human rights, political sovereignty (if officials are arrested like in previous raids)

Palestinians support radicals more because of anguish and need for security against Israel, which appears more malevolent than ever

Moderate Abbas loses support of people because of above reason

* - Questionable

Map of the GWOT, perception, and the fire paradox

Perception plays a key role in the so-called war on terror (or, in its global state, the GWOT) and the resulting blowback of US counterterrorism foreign policy: the fire paradox. Instead of focusing just on the domestic political and strategic front of the 'war on terror', I'll look at the US foreign policy and, specifically, the issue of perception in the fire paradox, a result of American counterterrorism efforts abroad, involved in the fight against terrorism.

Origins: radical Islamic terrorism and terrorist threat; US politics in general.
Map


Doing the math
War on terror [politics, policy] (retaliative strike against 9/11 terror attacks, etc.; counterterrorism) + global (allies + terror movements, etc.)
Perception [power] + ideology [both sides] (effect of war)
Fire paradox [some counterterrorism feeds terrorism] (blowback: side effect of war, perception plays key role) ideological + military

Reasoning
Fire paradox of US foreign counterterrorism of GWOT — Many counterterrorism policies ironically help inflame/incite terrorism because…

of US ideological stance (e.g., 'us against them') — (global) GWOT ideology

political decisions — GWOT policy

helps foster the idea of America as an imperial, evil power — GWOT perception

This is sure to (not) help Israel's terrorist situation...

Yes. Violating more international laws while isolating and angering the people already alienated and mad enough to support terrorism is a sure fire strategy [sarcasm]...

BBC News:

The international Red Cross has privately accused Israel of reshaping Jerusalem to further its own interests, in violation of international law.
...
Israel's unilateral moves in Jerusalem have been condemned by several UN Security Council Resolutions.

US and EU ambassadors have boycotted ceremonies in the run-up to Israel's Jerusalem Day on Wednesday, arguing that the status of the city should be determined by negotiations with the Palestinians.

When the US tears away from Israel, you know there is a major problem. Invade a sovereign nation in a questionable and overreacting manner, imposing disproportionate damage: OK. Expanding in your own interests a city of heated debate, thus worsening the situation for yourself and practically any nation: not OK.

I know Israel is not entirely to blame for the extremism shaping the region, and the many Palestinian movements, just as the US isn't entirely to blame for the terrorist movements growing in Iraq. But in both cases both countries consciously acted in a way that would worsen the very thing they are apparantly fighting against: Islamic extremist terrorism (see the fire paradox).

technorati tags: jerusalem, israel, terrorism, palestine, news, islamic+extremism

How to let an alleged terrorist off the hook...

More horrible American hypocrisy in the 'war on terror' involving a real terrorist — Luis Posada Carriles.

BBC News:

A US judge has dropped immigration charges against a Cuban exile, Luis Posada Carriles, who has been accused of blowing up a Cuban airliner.

Mr Posada, 79, was detained in May 2005 after entering the US illegally, but was released on bail last month.

A former CIA employee, he is wanted in Venezuela and Cuba over the downing of a Cuban airliner in 1976 in which 73 people died. He denies involvement.

US authorities have ruled out returning him to Cuba or Venezuela.
...
His lawyer, Felipe Millan, said the judge had ruled that statements by Mr Posada that were to be used against him had been obtained illegally.
...
US justice department spokesman Dean Boyd said: "We're reviewing the decision."

How hard is it to botch immigration charges? Compared to terrorism charges, it's pretty simple. I mean, honestly...

Posada is suspected of committing one of the worst terrorist acts in Latin American history. Apparantly — and this was in the height of the Cold War, where many innocents' blood was spilled at the hands of two great powers fighting via vague proxy — the United States knew ahead of time of the attack.

The Economist:

The Justice Department claims it did everything it could to dissuade the judge from ordering Mr Posada's release. “We can't just unilaterally order a person to be held,” a spokesman said. But critics point out that the government frequently does just that under the anti-terrorist Patriot Act.
...
Prosecutors say that he lied about how he returned to the United States in 2005 in order to protect fellow Cuban exiles in Miami who helped smuggle him in by boat. That may prove to be his undoing. But the failure to extradite him may make other countries warier of collaborating with American justice.

For once an almost certainly bona-fide terrorist can be put to justice, but he is not. Is that what America's GWOT symbolizes? Political hypocrisy and looking the other way? That just plays into the hands of the US's enemies — whether 'communist' or Qaeda — and is no doubt more bad PR possibly increasing the severity of attacks against America. The US did enough harm to Latin America in its previous 'war'. Isn't it time for justice before relations deteriorate further, and people like Hugo Chavez gain the upper hand?

Alas, Posada's health has taken a turn for the worse, which probably played a role in the judge's ruling on his release. While it's probably never too late for justice, the US missed its chance on showing its southern neighbors it wasn't all talk and hypocrisy.

This story — like several others of the Cold War — resembles a conspiracy spy movie-like plot, and it looks like our main character may yet get away with the acts he committed. It is the fault for the government back then for not stopping him, or even urging him; and the fault of the government now for not ending this chapter of a story that should have ended long ago.

technorati tags: Luis+Posada+Carriles, united+states, terrorism, war+On+terror, politics, justice, cold+war, cuba

Middle East diplomacy (part 1): another Iraq summit

Diplomatic relations with such a tumultuous region can be hard to maintain at times, but keeping the channels of communication open is essential in order to help fix the problems in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and elsewhere. In addition, discussion with states like Syria and Iran can resolve ongoing tensions. Unlike war, diplomacy is soft and does not always produce immediate effects. Some are dissatisfied with the outcome of diplomacy, but also unlike war there are few instances where diplomacy actually hurts the problem one or both sides wish to resolve.

I supported US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's recent (unofficial, non-policy related) diplomatic trip to Syria. By isolating Syria, this current administration has forced it nearer to Iran — by no means a positive influence. Lucky for the US, Syria is open to working with America and has an interest in the outcome of the current civil conflict in Iraq as well as the spread radical Islamic terrorism. The Syrians have even more to worry about political stability against terrorists than the US, also. The Iraq Study Group and many members of Congress have urged the White House to talk to Syria before relations deteriorate further and Iraq gets even worse.

Yesterday US Secretary of State Condi Rice met with the Syrian foreign minister, Walid al-Moallem, in a much-needed discussion. At the top of the agenda was Iraq, and Syria's borders — which many extremists cross through to enter Iraq — were also an issue.

The 30-minute session with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Moallem marks a diplomatic turning point for the Bush administration, which had resisted talks with Syria and Iran despite the recommendations of allies abroad and the Iraq Study Group and lawmakers from both parties at home.

The meeting was the first direct, official, and high-level talks between Syria, which President Bush has labeled an 'evil' state, and the United States in years. While some call talks like this 'talking with the enemy', Rice said her discussion with the Syrian FM was "professional", and that "I didn't lecture him and he didn't lecture me." However positive this news might be, signs are yet to reveal themselves of direct talks between the US and Iran. America came close to talking to its Persian arch-nemisis, but an official diplomatic discussion never panned out.

Both the U.S. and Iran had sounded interested, even eager, to improve on nearly three decades of name-calling and accusations. U.S. diplomats had pointed to the seaside conference about Iraq's future as a possible opening, and Iran's hardline president welcomed talks.

In the end, neither Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice nor Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki wanted to make the first move.

This discussion came during a conference in Egypt on the Iraq issue. Iran and Syria are both in attendance, as America finally showed a more logical and less stubborn diplomatic policy in similar talks on Iraq in late March. One development that comes as no surprise: Iran blames the US for Iraq's woes, which is only partially correct.

This summit on Iraq has resulted in an International Compact for Iraq (ICI), a five-year plan for financial help and 'national reconciliation' for Iraq. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon placed the stated 'financial commitments' to Iraq at over $30 billion. The conference included delegations from the United States, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Russia, China, and the European Union.

technorati tags: condi+rice, ban+ki-moon, iraq, international+compact+for+iraq, middle+east, syria, iran, diplomacy

Olmert's political losses

Ehud Olmert is a man with a problem — well, several problems in fact. He is the prime minister of a nuclear state, a world player in fact, with many security troubles and political conundrums. His country gets more attention than most; and the majority of his neighbors resent the country he governs. Olmert is the prime minister of Israel. He faces many problems: investigations into the ethics of his administration; the loss of political support within his new centrist party as well as in the wider population; frequent acts of terror from both inside and outside Israel's borders — among other issues. His personal goals — namely the much needed Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank — are in shambles and his nations external security is looking as bleak as ever. America seems to be the only steadfast ally, and even it is hinting at doubt in Israel's handling of itself and Olmert's handling of Israel. Every foreign policy move Olmert makes might find itself under international scrutiny.

So why is this flaring up all of the sudden? A panel released its findings of last summer's torrential Israeli-Lebanese war (i.e. the 2006 Lebanon War), which was mainly a conflict between Hezbollah and Israel's defense forces. (From the start the battle was seen as poorly executed, and this is a result of a major inquiry.) Lebanon is still unstable following the skirmish of summer 2006. Israel took the militant group's bait, and now Israel is seen as even more of an aggressor against innocents — in the Arab Muslim world as well as abroad.

An Israeli government commission excoriated Prime Minister Ehud Olmert on Monday for "severe failures" in last summer's war against the Lebanese militia Hezbollah, setting off a furious debate on whether he should remain in office.

The commission accused him of having decided hastily to go to war, neglecting to ask for a detailed military plan, refusing to consult outside the army and setting "over-ambitious and unobtainable goals."

Israel's political troubles are vast and wide. In its parliament, the Knesset, parties must gain power often by forming coalitions, many times with more extreme factions of the Israeli politik. Israelis also doubt how pulling out of Palestinian territories will help — they think the attacks will continue nonetheless just as some Palestinians fail to rationalize how a stop in the fighting will help them too.

Israel's policy towards Palestine is a prime example of the fire paradox at work: in fighting terrorism, Israel has created more. For example, Hezbollah's support has arguably grown following last year's conflict with Israel, which killed many civilians, left even more scared, and destroyed all too much. Hezbollah, fueled by funds from Iran, helped rebuild and aided civilians. However, some view Hezbollah's moves as haphazard and blame it for sparking the conflict with Israel. That launched a perpetual drive of terrorism and recruiters take advantage of the poor, hopeless, yet angered, Palestinians. And its a two-way street. There are also plenty of militant extremists within Israel, extra-Zionists, so to speak, who think the world is theirs for the taking, and Israel should not fail to resort to heavy military means when attacked.

How to fight the terror? Sending tanks into a neighborhood of Lebanon (home to Hezbollah) or Palestine (home to Hamas) that is already angry because its power and water supplies are cut off, and the bridge is blown up, does not help. There is also the issue of the politics within Israel's neighboring states. Would Israel rather moderate Islamic rule in its Arab neighbors, or dictatorships which are more of a hotbed for terror?

If Israel really wanted to take back its captured soldiers in Southern Lebanon and Palestine last summer, black ops or special forces could have gotten the job done much better. Now there are ever more terrorists, terrorist supporters, and potential terrorists wanting to get their revenge on the state who they feel harmed them and their people. Both the Israelis and their neighbors are also scared, and there are plenty of examples of how people act amazingly irrational when scared.

If Olmert is forced out or his political condition worsens, there are multiple fears about the potential repercussions:

A more conservative government might take power, and institute policies only making the Palestinian issue worse and not act in the true national interest;

Groups like Hezbollah will see it as a victory and will launch future, more powerful attacks;

Israel's domestic political situation will be very bad, to say the least;

Olmert, if still in office, will have to make concessions to conservative Israelis or political groups in order to stay in office, thus worsening the situation.

The execution of the war in Lebanon was botched from the start. Who is to blame? Should Olmert be forced out because of his government’s poor decision making, which costed and affected hundreds of thousands of Lebanese lives, not to mention many Israelis, and increased the tension between his country and its Middle Eastern neighbors, and the international community. The strategy also proved to be counter-intuitive and might yet breed more terrorism. Israelis should take note of these major mistakes, and in the future strive for not repeating them.

For now it looks like Olmert's job is secure. But with new protests, it's anyone's guess. One outcome could be a (more) hawkish, right-wing party — more conservative than Likud — winning over support from Olmert's ruling centrist Kadima party.

technorati tags: ehud+olmert, israel, hezbollah, hamas, terrorism, lebanon, middle+east, arab+israeli, 2006+lebanon+war, olmert+political+israel, palestine

Blowback: then, now, and in the years to come

A term used to describe the detrimental side effects — unintended by the US — of the current American fight in the civil war in Iraq is 'blowback'. Blowback is similar to the fire paradox in that they share the same premise: in fighting something, be it a war or insurgent terrorists in general, the opposite of intended outcomes are realized. Blowback is more specific to the fire paradox, because the fire paradox can be applied to, as used as an example in this paper, how certain policies in the 'war on terrorism' just create more terrorism. However, blowback can also be used to describe a case where terrorists are bred.

An article in Foreign Affairs presented the blowback argument — revisited. "Today's insurgents are tomorrow's terrorists,” the authors, Peter Bergen and Alec Reynolds, said. They also shared the parallels between America helping Afghan terrorists in what could effectively be described as a proxy war against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and the current US involvement in Iraq. The jihadist success in Afghanistan, which succeeded in forcing the Soviets to withdrawal, resulted in a worldwide surge in similar terrorist movements in the name of Islam.

Just as Palestine has been a breeding ground for terrorists — linked with others (mostly Arab Muslims) united against Israel — because of their plight, Iraq too is becoming the next major front for terrorist recruitment, more against America than ever. Some of this terrorism is targeted at the foreign troops, some at the weak Iraqi government, and some is just to stir up the sectarian violence. US occupation just worsens the radicalization. And seeing democracy as the cure is as shortsighted as it is naive. How could a democracy operate when the capitol building is a constant target of suicide bombers? Blowback in Iraq and Palestine will likely continue for at least another generation, if not longer if the civil war ceases to subside in Iraq and Israel and Palestine do not come so a final accord.

So could Iraq's potential or current terrorists come back and haunt the US and, indeed, the world? In reality, they already are. More so than in the case of Afghanistan? Probably. The civil war and American occupation, as well as an influx of terrorists, has made Iraq a hotbed of Islamic extremism.

The facets of terror

Throughout this month, I will be posting excerpts of my lengthy paper "The War on Terror and the Fire Paradox", as mentioned in this post. Here is one such excerpt...

Perspectives
The facets of terror
How can a rogue group or ideology commit acts of terrorism with major state reaction, but state terrorism yields no such reaction? Is fighting in something you genuinely believe in a crime? How is Islamic extremist recruitment for terrorism different from recruitment to a state military?

Whether fighting the foreign occupiers in Iraq, fighting the western menace from within its own borders, or abroad, there is a new kind of terrorism and no one seems to know what to define it as. Call it an insurgency against the West, call it a rebellious movement, call it pure terrorism.*

They fear the west; westerners fear them. The middlemen? The governments of the West, namely of the US, and the extremist Islamic groups. Terror, terror, terror; fear, fear, fear; counterterrorism, counterterrorism, counterterrorism; fear, fear, fear; terror, terror, terror... We usually think of the extremists as the terrorists; the western governments as the fighters of terrorism.

[What the 'terrorists' (supposedly) do] — [what the US 'war on terror' response is].
They want to invoke fear with their terror — I invoke your fear to fight their terror.
They use terrorism to take away our freedom — I use (counter)terrorism to actually take that freedom away.
They use acts of insurgency against us (e.g. in Iraq) — we shall stay (e.g. in Iraq).
They use terrorism to scare you — I use fear-mongering to my gain to scare you using their terror as an excuse.

Political science expert John Mueller says the terrorist threat has definitely been hyped up since 9/11, no doubt to the political gain of the Bush administration. Not only that, but the endeavors in Iraq and Afghanistan that followed inflamed feelings in the Muslim world even more. Mueller calls the lack of terrorist response on US soil, in which reality has contradicted what those in the White House keep stating, a "myth of the omnipresent enemy". He starts his article, "Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?: The Myth of the Omnipresent Enemy", with:

Despite all the ominous warnings of wily terrorists and imminent attacks, there has been neither a successful strike nor a close call in the United States since 9/11. The reasonable -- but rarely heard -- explanation is that there are no terrorists within the United States, and few have the means or the inclination to strike from abroad.

Mueller boldly concludes his article with:

Although it remains heretical to say so, the evidence so far suggests that fears of the omnipotent terrorist…may have been overblown, the threat presented within the United States by al Qaeda greatly exaggerated. The massive and expensive homeland security apparatus erected since 9/11 may be persecuting some, spying on many, inconveniencing most, and taxing all to defend the United States against an enemy that scarcely exists.

The Bush administration dumbs down all terrorism by labeling it as the evil, generic masses of Islamic extremists that are against the United States in every way. Al Qaeda is seen as a great terrorist enemy, a diabolical organization with cells all around the world. In reality, many experts disagree with the Bush administration view; al Qaeda is more of a movement, an ideology even, than an organization (see Burke in "Think Again: Al Qaeda").

* For the sake of keeping things simple, I will keep the assumed label of 'terrorist' for the extremists — in this case the radical Islamic insurgent terrorists. However, both sides, whether led by George W. Bush or Osama bin Laden, are using fear tactics to garner political support for their respective causes. The ultimate definition of terrorism I will lead up to the reader. However, that is not to say I will not present my clear views on the subject.

See here for a look at terrorism from two different viewpoints: that of the White House and that of the jihad movements.

Counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, counterintuitive

Throughout this month, I will be posting excerpts of my lengthy paper "The War on Terror and the Fire Paradox", as mentioned in this post. Here is one such excerpt...

Persuasive essay
To-the-point: counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, counterintuitive
Why do many current counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency, policies only make it all worse? US Global War on Terror and the proliferation of the radical, fundamentalist Islamic ideology in a terrorist insurgency relate to and feed on each other. One of the main causes of insurgent terrorism — modern and historical — may well be the fight against terrorism: counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Battles launched in the name of terrorism or against the name of terrorism often have the same affects: causing both sides to recruit for their pro- or counterterrorist causes.

One of my main doctrines, if you will, of the Middle East and elsewhere is that vengeance leads to vengeance. An eye for an eye is a ludicrous notion; why would one what everyone to be blind, including one’s self? This all relates to something called the fire paradox. This paradox is often used to describe how the fight against naturally reoccurring wildfires just leads to more of them — in greater number and voracity. I also apply it to counterterrorism, especially in the Middle East. Not to say we should not try to slow the rise of terrorism at all, but the way countries like the United States and Israel go about their anti-terrorism efforts is self-defeating and creates more destruction on both sides.

The fire paradox can be applied to the Middle East situation. The Gaza and West Bank problems will not go away until Israel and the US stop trying to destroy what they see as the problem, thus elevating the real problem. It is like with wildfires. Scientific data shows that the more people try to stop and put out wildfires, the greater in extremity and number those fires will be. The term — which I just found out existed after I wrote it down as the title a blog post — "fire paradox" was coined by European scientists launching a project to work on the ecological problem related to fires. This paradox applies to aspects of the situation in the Middle East, especially to what is going on in Iraq and Israel-Palestine. What Israel's decades-old policy does is destroy "terrorists", but the way they go about doing so creates a greater number of these "freedom fighters" who fight harder than ever. In fact, Israel’s policy directly affects perception in the Muslim world of America and, thus, relates to the so-called war on terrorism. The policy also spawns more terrorist movements and support for Islamic extremism.

The Israel-Palestine issue is a central fissure between the Muslim world and the West (i.e. N America and Europe) and connects policy to perception — especially since the US strongly supports Israel in an open manner — to terrorism, then resulting in counterterrorism/war on terror policy and more terror. One thing people can agree on is that "perceived threats to Islam create support for terrorism" (Fair, Haqqani "Think Again: Islamist Terrorism"). Because of the preemptive doctrine of the GWOT, nations and their peoples are even more apprehensive over American military action.

In discussing terrorism and the war on terror, one must also mull over insurgency, especially in areas tied politically to the war on terror, i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan. Those two countries are now hotbeds for terrorist recruitment. Between the sectarian militias fighting each other and the US in civil war-stricken Iraq and the resurgence of the fundamentalist Taliban in Afghanistan who knows how long the battle with insurgent terrorists will last — whether local to where the insurgency is, or even carried by a movement abroad. A notable article on counterinsurgency, which is directly related to counterterrorism and the fire paradox, is "Dead End: Counterinsurgency warfare as military malpractice" by Edward Luttwak.

True, there are the alternative methods and tactics of counterinsurgency warfare, but do they actually work? Insurgents do not always win, but their defeats can rarely be attributed to counterinsurgency warfare, as we shall see.
...
[There's an] essentially political nature of the struggle against insurgents. ... amid the frustrations of fighting a mostly invisible enemy
...
a necessary if not sufficient condition of victory is to provide what the insurgents cannot: basic public services, physical reconstruction, the hope of economic development and social amelioration. The hidden assumption here is that there is only one kind of politics in this world, a politics in which popular support is important or even decisive, and that such support can be won by providing better government. ...many people prefer indigenous and religious oppression to the freedoms offered by foreign invaders [in Iraq or Afghanistan].
…
Instead, they obeyed…who summoned them to fight against the ungodly innovations of the foreign invader. ...That was all that mattered to most…not what was proposed but by whom it was proposed.
…
The vast majority of Afghans and Iraqis naturally believe their religious leaders. The alternative would be to believe what for them is entirely unbelievable: that foreigners are unselfishly expending blood and treasure in order to help them.

Altruism isn't something people can easily be convinced of, especially if the source is a long time 'enemy'. Contrary to popular belief, support for terrorism and jihad may not correlate with poverty as much as previously thought (see Fair, Haqqani), although education and willingness to believe things other than what religious or political authorities tell people does matter.

...
[Insurgents] must have at least the passive cooperation of local inhabitants. …out of sympathy for their cause or in terror of their vengeance...
…
The essentially political advantage of the insurgents in commanding at least the silence of the local population cannot be overcome by technical means no matter how advanced.
...
All its best methods, all its clever tactics, all the treasure and blood that the United States has been willing to expend, cannot overcome the crippling ambivalence of occupiers who refuse to govern, and their principled and inevitable refusal to out-terrorize the insurgents, the necessary and sufficient condition of a tranquil occupation.

The original 'fire paradox'

Throughout this month, I will be posting excerpts of my lengthy paper "The War on Terror and the Fire Paradox", as mentioned in this post. Here is one such excerpt...

The original 'fire paradox'
From the Fire Paradox project website:

The fire paradox is visible on every continent. … In Europe, a few years later than North America, it became apparent that a systematically implemented policy of fire exclusion in fact often produces the opposite of the desired effect. It aggravates the overall fire risks, due to an increase in the "protected", accumulating biomass. Based on the experience of a few practitioners and the results of past fire ecology research, the aim of this project is to develop new policies for fire management and forest fire risk reduction, adapted to European constraints.

Many counterterrorism/counterinsurgency efforts just lead to the spread of terrorism and the movement’s growth, much like how the efforts against natural fires only worsens them in the future. Osama Bin Laden is not a tree; but you get my point. Also, the real fire paradox sometimes calls for intentional fire-starting; prescribed burning, if you will. In no way am I saying we should promote terrorism, but many counterterrorism efforts do just that.

While one might be able to lessen the chance and extremity of future wildfires by not using counterintuitive preventative measures, the fight against terrorism is different — and, albeit, more complex. If one does not try to fight (per se) terrorism at all, the terrorism could be about just as bad. That’s why measures other than the ones being used by the Bush administration are needed. Nonetheless, many counterterrorism or moderate counterinsurgency efforts end up feeding into the basic premise of the fire paradox: the counter- efforts only make the original enemy, the thing being countered, worse.

Want a rough background on the paradox? See my first post on it.

Nothing to fear but fear (terrorism) itself?

The source of terror is a matter deeply debated between scholars. Terrorists generally view themselves to be above any laws or authority — after all, that’s what they are fighting. Terrorism is political violence; violence is used to incite fear and change; intimidation with either the fear of violence or the direct connection between violence and the resulting fear.

The Bush administration's "war on terror" has proven to be a perfect utility for the reaping of political capital and the submission of the American people. I've argued that since day one of this blog. Since then, I've branched out and have been writing a paper on "The War on Terror and the Fire Paradox", while posting excerpts (the final, edited copy will be posted as a PDF and text file once it is finished).

Naturally, I am not the only person who believes the 'war on terror' is a tool of a diluted sort of terror in itself — but not in the pejorative sense we often think of when we hear the word "terrorism". A great opinion piece in the Washington Post was published today that echoes many of my arguments:

The "war on terror" has created a culture of fear in America. The Bush administration's elevation of these three words into a national mantra since the horrific events of 9/11 has had a pernicious impact on American democracy, on America's psyche and on U.S. standing in the world. Using this phrase has actually undermined our ability to effectively confront the real challenges we face from fanatics who may use terrorism against us.

The damage these three words have done -- a classic self-inflicted wound -- is infinitely greater than any wild dreams entertained by the fanatical perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks when they were plotting against us in distant Afghan caves. The phrase itself is meaningless. It defines neither a geographic context nor our presumed enemies. Terrorism is not an enemy but a technique of warfare -- political intimidation through the killing of unarmed non-combatants.
...
The sense of a pervasive but otherwise imprecise danger was thus channeled in a politically expedient direction by the mobilizing appeal of being "at war."

To justify the "war on terror," the administration has lately crafted a false historical narrative that could even become a self-fulfilling prophecy. By claiming that its war is similar to earlier U.S. struggles against Nazism and then Stalinism (while ignoring the fact that both Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia were first-rate military powers, a status al-Qaeda neither has nor can achieve), the administration could be preparing the case for war with Iran. Such war would then plunge America into a protracted conflict spanning Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and perhaps also Pakistan.

The culture of fear is like a genie that has been let out of its bottle. It acquires a life of its own -- and can become demoralizing. America today is not the self-confident and determined nation that responded to Pearl Harbor; nor is it the America that heard from its leader, at another moment of crisis, the powerful words "the only thing we have to fear is fear itself"; nor is it the calm America that waged the Cold War with quiet persistence despite the knowledge that a real war could be initiated abruptly within minutes and prompt the death of 100 million Americans within just a few hours. We are now divided, uncertain and potentially very susceptible to panic in the event of another terrorist act in the United States itself.
...
Such fear-mongering, reinforced by security entrepreneurs, the mass media and the entertainment industry, generates its own momentum.
...
That America has become insecure and more paranoid is hardly debatable.
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The record is even more troubling in the general area of civil rights. The culture of fear has bred intolerance, suspicion of foreigners and the adoption of legal procedures that undermine fundamental notions of justice.
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In the meantime, the "war on terror" has gravely damaged the United States internationally. For Muslims, the similarity between the rough treatment of Iraqi civilians by the U.S. military and of the Palestinians by the Israelis has prompted a widespread sense of hostility toward the United States in general. It's not the "war on terror" that angers Muslims watching the news on television, it's the victimization of Arab civilians. And the resentment is not limited to Muslims.
...
The events of 9/11 could have resulted in a truly global solidarity against extremism and terrorism. A global alliance of moderates, including Muslim ones, engaged in a deliberate campaign both to extirpate the specific terrorist networks and to terminate the political conflicts that spawn terrorism would have been more productive than a demagogically proclaimed and largely solitary U.S. "war on terror" against "Islamo-fascism." Only a confidently determined and reasonable America can promote genuine international security which then leaves no political space for terrorism.

I talk about perception and the 'war on terrorism' in this post and examine why we are so attracted to terrorism here.