Although met with its fair share of controversy, the Monroe Doctrine has influenced United States foreign policy in Latin America and elsewhere over the ages. The Monroe Doctrine, announced in 1823, came to define much of the foreign policy of the United States of America. Created to minimize European interference in Latin America, notably in independent states, the Doctrine has been interpreted many ways over the ages. As long as European empires did not cause trouble in the affairs of non-colonies, the U.S. would stay neutral during wars either between European powers or between a power and its colony. This neutrality would be in effect unless the U.S. felt that the conflict was either endangering the Americas or that it was hostile to the United States itself.
The creation of the Holy Alliance - Austria, Prussia, and Russia - was the event that created this new outlook of U.S. foreign policy, and ultimately the creation of the Monroe Doctrine. The Holy Alliance (which France later joined) had formed because of the mutual belief of the Alliance members that any revolutionary acts in Europe seeking to overthrow government(s) should be quashed by the members of the Alliance (Dolan 24). When the Alliance members announced ambitions to take lands in the New World, the United States and Great Britain were both disturbed. Britain proposed an alliance between the two nations, but the United States finally dissented because of Secretary of State John Quincy Adams. Adams convinced Monroe and other figures that the U.S. should establish its own independent policy (however the British military, in the end, helped the U.S. enforce the Doctrine), spawning the birth of the Monroe Doctrine (Dolan 24-25).
According to Wikipedia, when the Monroe Doctrine was first announced in President Monroe’s seventh yearly State of the Union speech to Congress, many were uneasy about the bold new policy. However, statesmen eventually showed excitement about the license of power that their young nation now had in the Americas. A leading figure in the creation of the Doctrine was Monroe’s Secretary of State and eventual successor, John Quincy Adams. Adams viewed the Doctrine as a defiance by the United States of Old World colonialism, but other interpretations, such as views that the Doctrine warranted the U.S. to practice colonialism and imperialism in its own right, were starkly different.
The very principle of the Monroe Doctrine was contrary to what Adams had said in 1821: “but she [America] goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy” (Kissinger, Diplomacy 35). The self-restraint policy Adams preached in 1821 was seemingly gone by 1823, as a new foreign policy was crafted. The Monroe Doctrine was the cornerstone for this new policy of “[excluding] European power politics from the Western Hemisphere, if necessary by using [ . . .] European diplomacy” (Kissinger, Diplomacy 35).
With the Monroe Doctrine the sphere of influence of Britain and Spain, two “Old World powers", was removed from the Americas. Britain had already surrendered its claims to what was now the United States and Spain was loosing its grip on Latin America because of the Monroe Doctrine’s central policy. Thus, the United States was free to act as its own power, without intervention, in the Americas (Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? 239).
America was [ . . .] turning its back on Europe [ . . .] [while] freeing its hands to expand in the Western Hemisphere under the umbrella of the Monroe Doctrine, America could pursue policies [ . . .] not all that different from [ . . .] [that of] European king[s] - expanding its commerce and influence, annexing territory - in short [ . . .] [becoming] a Great Power without [ . . .] power politics. (Diplomacy 36)
When a conflict arose with a European nation wanting to colonize or re-colonize a Caribbean [or other colonized] land, the Monroe Doctrine was put into action determining which side the U.S. would join. Ultimately, the U.S. usually chose the side that would provide a short-term benefit economically instead of halting the flow of European influence. Such actions contradict much of the very meaning of the Doctrine. “In 1823, the Monroe Doctrine had warned the European powers to keep out of [the West] [ . . . .] [By 1923] the meaning had been gradually expanded to justify American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere” (Kissinger, Diplomacy 36).
The policy had still not been named in 1836 when it was first truly implemented [in principle]. There was opposition by the U.S. to the alliance Great Britain was building with Texas (Wikipedia). This event fed into the very foundation of the Monroe Doctrine, and, although quite some time would pass until the Doctrine was seen as a prominent policy, the bar was raised for a more independent foreign policy for administrations to come. This foreign policy standard was largely the result of John Quincy Adams’ actions.
President Polk, in 1845, had stated a policy of expansionism for America. Polk showed that, when referring to the “national security” threat of Texas, the Monroe Doctrine “justified American intervention not only against an existing threat, but any [possible one]” (Kissinger 36). President Andrew Johnson in 1868 “was back at the old stand of justifying expansion by the Monroe Doctrine” (Kissinger, Diplomacy 37), in regard to the American annexation of Alaska after fears that Russia could possibly stake claim to it. Johnson’s Secretary of State had more ambitious dreams and aspirations “of an empire including Canada, [ . . .] much of Mexico, and extending into the Pacific” (Kissinger, Diplomacy 37).
In the middle and late 1800s the United States greatly developed as a nation. The U.S. surpassed Great Britain by 1885 in the exporting of manufactured goods, even though Britain was known to be the industrial power of the world (Kissinger, Diplomacy 37). By 1900, the U.S. “was consuming more energy than Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Japan, and Italy combined” (Kissinger, Diplomacy 37). Nonetheless, America had a very, very small army and navy and was viewed as an isolationist in diplomatic terms, as there were cases of diplomats offering pay cuts “rather than [to] be [ . . .] [stationed] in Washington” (Kissinger, Diplomacy 37).
The most significant modification of the Monroe Doctrine happened in December of 1904, when President Theodore Roosevelt added his own corollary to the Doctrine. Roosevelt announced this addition during an address to Congress at a time when Latin America was being affected by the United States and other external powers’ influence. Roosevelt’s addition came to be known as the Roosevelt Corollary (Wikipedia). The Roosevelt Corollary stated that, as Grolier’s New Book of Knowledge encyclopedia puts it, “although European intervention in the Americas might sometimes be justified, it could not be permitted under the Monroe Doctrine; instead, the United States itself would take action in the country involved. [It justified] [ . . .] U.S. intervention in [ . . .] Latin American countries” (Bemis).
After World War 1, the The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia states that “The Monroe Doctrine was so deeply embedded in U.S. foreign policy by the end of World War I that Woodrow Wilson asked for a special exception for it in the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1919.” In addition, by the year 1929, the importance of the Doctrine greatly decreased as the United States tried to form better ties with Latin America. The Clark memorandum of December 1928 officially dropped the Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine (‘Columbia’)
Over the 1900s, the Monroe Doctrine was used many times to justify actions taken in Latin America. Some of these actions were more disputed than others, especially when the U.S. invoked regime changes during the Cold War in countries like Chile. In 1898, the U.S. declared war on Spain, blaming them for the explosion of a U.S. warship (this accusation was later found false), which led the U.S. to occupy Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines (Rosenfelder; Wikipedia). In 1903, after America had already taken over Cuba, the Platt Amendment to the Monroe Doctrine was put into the Cuban constitution enabling the U.S. to “intervene when it sees fit” (Rosenfelder); the amendment was repealed in 1934 (Hilaire 42).
Throughout the early 20th century, the U.S. sometimes questionably created regime changes in Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and other nations, as well as occupying or invading (and many times running or controlling in some way) Mexico, Nicaragua, Honduras, Panama, Haiti, Cuba, Dominican Republic, and El Salvador, among others. In addition, the CIA and other clandestine agencies also interfered with many Latin American nations from the 1950s through the 1980s (Rosenfelder; Wikipedia). Many of these interferences, including regime changes, the establishing of puppet governments, assassinations, occupations, and embargoes, were done in the climate of fear of communism that encapsulated the Cold War, some of which the legality is disputed and the “claim of self-defense” had “no legal basis” (Hilaire 96). Many times regimes were changed from left-leaning or even moderate democracies or republics to military dictatorships, because of the fear that the democracies or republics could turn to communism.
Even in today’s modern world, the Monroe Doctrine does not go unnoticed. The present situation of Latin America as well as issues such as the United States’ control over the internet are major issues. Foreign Affairs magazine writes:
Everyone understands that the Internet is crucial for the functioning of modern economies, societies, and even governments, and everyone has an interest in seeing that it is secure and reliable. But at the same time, many governments are bothered that such a vital resource exists outside their control and, even worse, that it is under the thumb of an already dominant United States. Washington's answer to these concerns -- the Commerce Department's four terse paragraphs, released at the end of June, announcing that the United States plans to retain control of the Internet indefinitely -- was intended as a sort of Monroe Doctrine for our times. It was received abroad with just the anger one would expect, setting the stage for further controversy. (Cukier)
In addition, modern communist nations like China and their fairly close relations with some currently left-leaning governments in Latin America has aroused a new sense of fear that the U.S. felt in the Cold War era. When speaking of the recently strengthened relations between China and Brazil, a BBC News article stated that, “Since then China's influence can be seen everywhere in Latin America: oil, gas, railways, ports, steel and - worryingly for the US - defence.” The article goes on to say that “The Monroe Doctrine was last used in earnest during the Cold War, when just about every Latin American country which veered to the left - from Chile to Nicaragua - experienced some form of US intervention” (Hawksley).
In recent days following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, United States foreign policy has drastically changed into a policy of searching and policing the globe for possible terrorists. As a magazine article concluded: “When the United States goes out alone in search of monsters to destroy-venturing in terrain upon which imperial powers have already trod-it can itself become the monster” (Judis).
Today, many countries of the Americas belong to an establishment called the Organization of American States (OAS). The OAS’ objective, according to its website, is to bring “together the countries of the Western Hemisphere to strengthen cooperation and advance common interests.” Issues like trade, security, and human rights are all addressed at the OAS.
The Monroe Doctrine has shown effects on foreign policy since its conception in the early 19th century. The Doctrine has been adapted and controversially used and interpreted for many different events and issues in the United States of America's history. Some have viewed the doctrine as an excuse for imperialism or war, some as an isolationist policy, but there is no question of the great influence it has had on American foreign policy through the ages.
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